Then it turned out that Kyiv had become the capital of an independent Ukraine, and its history—naturally—part of the history of the Ukrainian people, which contradicted stereotypes deeply rooted in Russian mass consciousness. Questions even arose about the nation’s very self-name. The Kremlin tried “on the fly” to offer a new answer to the question “Where do we come from?”, based on an unconfirmed legend about the Apostle Andrew the First-Called having been in Chersonesus (near present-day Sevastopol).
And on the real historical fact of the baptism of Prince Volodymyr of Kyiv (who, incidentally, as described by Byzantine chroniclers, looked like a later-era Zaporizhian Cossack—even with an oseledets topknot). Nevertheless, a new “shrine” for the people was urgently built near Sevastopol. But, as the puppet character Khryun Morzhov from what was then independent Russian television once said: “Doesn’t convince.”
And now, after four years of war, there are no doubts—even among Russians themselves—about the national distinctiveness of Ukrainians and their separateness from Russians. Much is now said about the need to fight the falsification of history, meaning only the history of the Soviet–German war. I agree: falsifying history is extremely dangerous—any history. The only effective cure for imperial complexes is the blood of sons. I think that so no nation has to take this bitter medicine, independent historians should compile a common objective version of the region’s history over the past thousand years and disseminate it widely in an accessible form (for example, as comics).
4. The desire to force the West to lift the sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea.
In the Kremlin, thanks to the (all too) loose tongue of a certain local politician, for some reason the belief took root that European politicians “have no balls,” unlike “tough” dictators. But four years ago it became clear that democratic leaders have this accessory too. Claiming otherwise shows ignorance of the region’s history.
In 1939 Stalin issued an ultimatum to the Baltic states and Finland, demanding that they accept Soviet military bases. Dictators ruled the Baltic states then. They accepted Stalin’s terms because they feared him less than they feared their own peoples. Those countries lost their independence. Parliamentary Finland refused. The parliament granted broad powers to organize defense to General Mannerheim, whom the parliamentary Social Democratic majority, to put it mildly, did not particularly like: during the suppression of a local Red Guard uprising twenty years earlier, he had sent many comrades and friends of Social Democratic deputies under the ice of the Gulf of Finland. For about twenty years afterward he was almost untouchable politically, but he created a civic organization and, anticipating Soviet aggression, trained many thousands of skier-riflemen and snipers who during the war with the USSR—where the latter suffered a shameful defeat—became a true nightmare for the Red Army.
Thus, four years ago, showing resolve, European politicians not only were not intimidated and did not lift sanctions, but began an economic war against Russia, as a result of which the Russian economy is in recession—masked in public statistics for propaganda purposes by means of a deflator coefficient. Significant additional financial losses are incurred by the propagandistic demonstration of the absence of international isolation. Visits of leaders of so-called “friendly countries” to Moscow cost the budget tens of billions of dollars, because these “friends” come only for substantial discounts on Russian oil or gas. Russia’s share of global GDP is about 3% and falling, and claims that, in fact, with purchasing power parity (PPP) Russia has already overtaken Germany do not help Russian propaganda, because if PPP is applied to all countries it turns out Russia has already been overtaken by Indonesia, with Brazil close behind.