— Entering Sana’a versus blockade for blockade:

Since the bombing of Sana’a Airport on July 13, the confrontation in Yemen has evolved between two competing projects: a Saudi project adopted by the Aden government, centred on entering Sana’a, and a project pursued by the Sana’a government, centred on the principle of blockade for blockade. To assess the outcome of this confrontation, gains and losses must be measured by how close each side has come to achieving its objectives. Sana’a has not made the removal of the Aden government a condition for a ceasefire. Instead, it has sought to make Saudi Arabia pay the price for continuing to close Yemen’s crossings, ultimately aiming to lift the blockade. Its opponents, by contrast, have tied the war to changing the authorities in the capital, an objective that requires a decisive ground offensive that cannot be replaced by the intensity of airstrikes.

The first response to the airport bombing came on the same day, with the announcement of attacks targeting Abha Airport with missiles and drones, alongside a warning to airlines against flying through Saudi airspace. The message was clear: restricting access to Sana’a would be met with threats to Saudi Arabia’s own gateways. Riyadh consequently shifted from being the party capable of imposing restrictions on its opponent’s movement to one forced to allocate resources to protecting its airports and air traffic. The ability of Saudi aircraft to reach Sana’a was no longer the sole measure of superiority; Sana’a’s ability to strike deep inside Saudi territory had also become part of the equation.

On July 20, a naval blockade was announced against shipping linked to Saudi Arabia in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The response expanded from airports to the routes connecting the Saudi economy with global markets. The principle of “blockade for blockade” does not require the two sides to possess equal military strength. Rather, it requires Sana’a to have the means to disrupt interests that its adversary depends on maintaining. The blockade’s effectiveness, however, must be assessed through shipping movements, insurance costs and delivery schedules, not military announcements alone. Nevertheless, the declaration established from the outset the objective that subsequent operations were intended to serve.

Throughout August, Mokha Port came under repeated missile and drone attacks that struck its docks, vessels and facilities, disrupting some shipping routes. In September, the confrontation shifted towards changing the territorial situation on the ground. On September 10, Sana’a’s forces entered Mokha after government forces lost positions in Hays and Al-Khawkhah. On September 11, Reuters quoted sources within the Yemeni government as saying that Ansar Allah had taken control of Dhubab, while government forces withdrew from Mayyun Island and Sana’a’s forces reached it. The advance thus extended to positions that provide direct influence over the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

These gains benefit Sana’a to the extent that they strengthen its counter-blockade, expand its coastal presence, improve its ability to monitor and threaten maritime routes, and make securing shipping through military force alone more difficult. The same losses weaken the Aden government by reducing the launch and supply bases intended to support an offensive towards Sana’a. Having lost Mokha and then Dhubab, its forces must first recover their positions and protect their supply lines before attempting to advance towards the capital. Geography that Riyadh and Aden had counted on to secure a decisive victory has therefore become a source of leverage for Sana’a.

On October 5, Rashad al-Alimi announced Operation Dawn of Yemen, under the stated objective of liberating Sana’a. Reuters reported the government’s announcement that it had retaken Mokha, Dhubab and Bab al-Mandab.

🔻@enemywatch

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