In other words, the source presents this division as illegal.

Chinggis Khan was angry. When Jochi, Chagatai, and Ögedei came to him, he refused to receive his sons for three days.

The SHM’s statement that Chinggis Khan appointed Ögedei as commander of the operation against Urgench contradicts two independent sources, al-Nasawi and Juzjani. Both of them indicate that Jochi was the leader of the campaign. The whole story in the SHM also does not fit the sequence of events that can be reconstructed from other sources.

The meeting of the three princes with their father described in the SHM probably never happened. All known sources describing their later movements indicate that only Chagatai and Ögedei went directly to Chinggis Khan. Jochi, in contrast, went north to Desht-i Qipchaq.

After the fall of Urgench, the three brothers met their father together only once, in the summer of 1223 at Qulan-Bashi. It is unlikely that Chinggis Khan would have waited three years and then publicly criticized his sons at the kurultai of 1223.

This story in the SHM is a typical example of a politically motivated construction. The author did more than simply claim that Chinggis Khan gave Ögedei the leading role in the capture of Urgench. In his version, the division of Urgench among the princes was itself illegal and was cancelled by Chinggis Khan.

Conclusion

Why did the author of the SHM need to make such complex changes to the text? The reason is that historical precedent was an important legal basis of Chinggisid political tradition. A real or supposed decision made by Chinggis Khan or one of his successors could have the force of a legal precedent. Such precedents could be confirmed not only by khans’ decrees, but also by historical texts.

A good example is the redistribution of lands in Northern China by Ögedei between the Uru’ud and Mangqut tribes in the 1230s, as described in the Yuan Shi. By Ögedei’s order, the status and possessions of the Mangqut were increased at the expense of the Uru’ud.

This decision was justified by information found in certain texts, probably the biography of Quyildar. According to this account, during the Battle of Qalaqaljit Elet in 1203, the Uru’ud leader Jürchedai did not volunteer when Chinggis Khan called for volunteers. Instead, he “sat there, stroking his whip.” In contrast, Quyildar, the leader of the Mangqut, volunteered.

For a modern reader, the stories in the SHM about doubts concerning Jochi’s parentage or about his loss of rights to the lands of Khwarazm may seem simply like interesting stories. But for a Mongol aristocrat of the 13th century, such accounts could be extremely important. In certain circumstances, they could influence the outcome of a conflict within the Chinggisid dynasty.

In such a political context, what mattered was not historical truth, but political advantage.