On September 21, 2001, an Aeroflot Ilyushin Il-86 was operating a scheduled passenger flight from Moscow to Dubai. On board were 307 passengers and 15 crew members.

In the cockpit was a highly experienced crew. The captain had logged 16,501 flight hours, including 6,080 hours on the Il-86. The first officer had 8,920 hours of flight time, with 1,126 hours on type. Also present were a flight engineer and a navigator.

The flight itself proceeded without incident, and the aircraft was on final approach to Dubai. During this leg, the captain was instructing the first officer on landing procedures at Dubai airport.

Many airports enforce strict noise abatement regulations, requiring aircraft to delay gear extension until just prior to touchdown to minimize engine thrust and noise over residential areas. Gear extension increases drag, which in turn requires more engine power - and thus more noise - during approach. In Russia, noise restrictions are not as stringent, and standard operating procedures require that the landing gear be extended before the flaps are set to the landing position.

Soviet- and Russian-built aircraft are configured so that if the flaps are extended before the landing gear is down, both visual and aural warnings are triggered. These warning systems are loud and can be distracting. Pilots who fly abroad frequently may disable the aural warning to avoid nuisance alarms.

As the crew prepared for landing, the captain ordered the aural warning system to be silenced before the landing gear was extended. The flight engineer formally read out the checklist - and answered each item himself - under the false assumption that the gear had already been extended. Meanwhile, the captain and first officer, preoccupied with training, did not listen to the checklist, in violation of standard procedures. No one verified the actual gear position, and the silenced warning system masked the oversight. As a result, the crew lost situational awareness regarding the landing gear.

The aircraft touched down smoothly, with almost no vertical load - but on its belly. It skidded down the runway. Initially, the crew did not realize that the gear had not been deployed. They attempted to deploy thrust reversers, and the captain even demanded the first officer “release the brakes.”

Unknown: Shut it down.
Unknown: It’s on fire.
Unknown: It’s on fire.
GPWS: IL-86 AIRCRAFT FIRE.
Unknown: We’re burning!
Navigator: 170.
Navigator: 160.
GPWS: IL-86 AIRCRAFT FIRE.
Unknown: Shut down number one.
Captain: Release the brakes.
GPWS: ENGINE ONE.
Navigator: 120, 130.
Captain: Disable reverse.
GPWS: ENGINE ONE.
Unknown: Turn off reverse.
Unknown: Check it.
Captain: Turn on all fire systems.
GPWS: ENGINE FOUR.
Unknown: Come on, come on.
GPWS: GEAR NOT DOWN.
GPWS: CHECK ENGINE ONE.
Captain: Release the brakes! Why are you stuck?
GPWS: TOTAL HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE.

The fact that the aircraft had landed gear-up was first noticed by a flight attendant due to engine fires. The rear cargo hold also caught fire. Once the aircraft came to a stop, airport emergency services quickly extinguished the flames, and all passengers and crew were safely evacuated. No injuries were reported.

Media sources later stated that four crew members had their licenses immediately revoked following the landing. Aeroflot subsequently dismissed the deputy flight director, the commander of the Il squadron, and the commander of the Il-86 flight unit. The airline also compensated passengers for lost baggage at a rate of $20 per kilogram and paid the Dubai airport approximately $10 million for a 13-hour runway closure while the aircraft was towed to a remote stand.

The aircraft suffered severe structural and engine damage. The forward panels of the left wing’s front spar were deformed, the nose section of the wing near the third engine pylon was burned, and multiple wing panels were fire-damaged. The Il-86 was written off and eventually sunk in the Persian Gulf, later serving as a training site for recreational divers.