​​Children at the control wheel and crash of Airbus A310 in Russia, 1994

Part 3

The co-pilot finally took a working position and lowers the airplane’s nose to get out of the spin. The captain was able to pull the child out and sit in the left seat. The struggle for control began. But at this moment plane went into a dive and rushed towards the ground at high speed.

Captain: I turned on the thrust!
Co-pilot: Full throttle!
Captain: I gave it!
Co-pilot: Full throttle.
Captain: I turned on the thrust, I did.
Captain: What's the speed?
Co-pilot: I haven't looked at the device!
Captain: So.
Captain: So
Captain: Full throttle!
Co-pilot: Very high speed!
Captain: Big, yes?
Co-pilot: Big, of course!
Captain: I turned it on…
Co-pilot: All right, let's go out, let's go out.
Co-pilot: To the right! Right leg!
Co-pilot: High speed.
Co-pilot: Thrust idle!
Captain: Done!
Co-pilot: Slowly, slowly!

At the last moment, at an altitude of 400 meters, the pilots managed to put the aircraft into horizontal flight. But it was dark outside, they didn’t understand where they were. And suddenly, at full speed, they crashed into the slope of a 600-meter hill.

Co-pilot: again!
Captain: Don't turn to the right.
Captain: Added speed…
Captain: Let's go out now! It's okay!
Captain: Slowly pull up.
Captain: Slowly.
Captain: Slowly, damn it!
The sound of a blow, a short crack
~End of recording~

The conclusion of the Interstate Aviation Committee cited numerous crew errors as the cause. The crash of the aircraft occurred as a result of a combination of factors that led to the aircraft entering stall mode with a corkscrew transition and collision with the ground.

The most important factor was that the captain allowed his son to occupy his workstation and interfere with the control of the aircraft. In the course of this, the aircraft performed demonstration manoeuvres using the autopilot that were not foreseen in the flight plan and flight situation. The captain's son and co-pilot then applied forces to the controls that prevented the autopilot from operating normally on roll, which is not recommended by the flight operations manual. This circumstance led to overboosting and disconnection of the autopilot from the aileron control wiring. At the same time, none of the crew members noticed it.

Subsequently, the captain's son turned the steering wheel slightly, which led to the development of a right roll. The captain and co-pilot detected it too late. A conspicuous signalling would have attracted the attention of the crew in this situation.

The autopilot, which continued to perform its functions of maintaining altitude even after disconnecting the rudder, brought the aircraft into the aerodynamic shake mode and high angles of attack. In this situation, the co-pilot's actions were inadequate and ineffective. He did not switch off the autopilot in time and did not give the steering wheel "away from himself".

A criminal investigation was started on the fact of the disaster, but it was discontinued due to the death of the accused. The Deputy Director General of Aeroflot stated that in accordance with international standards, compensation will be paid to all relatives of the victims — $ 20,000 for each deceased and $ 20 for 1 kilogram of luggage. Subsequently, he claimed that the airline had satisfied 80% of the requirements, except for a few relatives who had requested "hundreds of thousands of dollars".