■ The Role of the Shiite Community in Lebanon and the Diaspora

Implementing the program requires developing a strategy for reaching different social and economic constituencies outside the south, including the Bekaa, the southern suburbs, and urban communities, as well as Lebanese diaspora networks in West Africa, the Gulf, South America, and Europe.

These constituencies represent additional pressure points that amplify the fracturing of the ecosystem.

The recovery of depositors’ funds, through a credible process enshrined in law and subject to international oversight, constitutes one of the direct pillars for restoring confidence in the recovery process. Every Shiite family that lost its deposits in the banking collapse has a direct material interest in the success of the program. If Hezbollah obstructs the program, it would be obstructing the process of recovering depositors’ funds. This is a position that no political actor could sustain in the face of an entire community.

Likewise, Lebanese Shiite diaspora networks in West Africa, South America, the Gulf, and Europe constitute a large base for fundraising in support of the armed project. The success of a strategy for engaging these communities would come through reliable information regarding the dedicated process for recovering depositors’ funds, guarantees of adherence to the reconstruction process, and compliance with direct digital administration, thereby helping create a pressure mechanism from the outside inward.

Accordingly, the benefits of the program must be tangible not only in the south, but in all areas with Shiite majorities. The Bekaa and the southern suburbs should see direct investment, employment opportunities, and the provision of services. If the program is perceived as an initiative confined to the south, it would fragment support for the state rather than consolidate it.

Although prioritizing the participation of the constituencies most affected by the conflict is important, national legitimacy depends on engagement with Christian, Sunni, Druze, and non-sectarian civil constituencies around state reconstruction, the recovery of depositors’ funds, and combating corruption. The program is not a sectarian undertaking, but rather a national compact; however, it begins by operating in the areas most severely affected by the war.