■ Reconstruction in Parallel with Maximum Pressure

The “State Reconstruction Program” needs to be supported by the current maximum-pressure campaign against Iran, as is the case today.

The two tracks are complementary: sanctions, military deterrence, diplomatic isolation, and the attrition caused by war have all contributed to reducing Iran’s ability to finance, resupply, and direct its network of proxies.

Pressure exerted by weakening funding, weapons, and direction is compatible with a program that demonstrates the need for reconstruction, so that people will relinquish their reliance on the proxy because the state will provide the services. The two tracks are clearly interconnected, because maximum pressure without providing an alternative through the state would leave people dependent on armed power, even as that power weakens. Likewise, reconstruction without pressure would allow the armed project to reconstitute itself faster than the state could absorb it. Synchronizing pressure with reconstruction places pressure on the armed project from both sides simultaneously. Success in this experiment would mean lasting security stability along Israel’s northern border. The United States would gain a diplomatic achievement that the president could celebrate, Iran’s proxy structure would be weakened, and a model would be provided for the region—all at a cost of $40 billion, which amounts to less than 8% of the cumulative cost of perpetual war.

Even partial success—if reconstruction were limited to parts of the south, only partial recovery of depositors’ funds were achieved, the Lebanese Army were deployed in certain areas, and cracks appeared in the cohesion of the ecosystem—would leave Lebanon in a much better position compared with the current situation. Every dollar delivered for reconstruction, every beneficiary reached, and every village rebuilt would represent a lasting gain, regardless of whether the program were fully implemented. Lebanon would, at the very least, have tested the only path capable of changing its current trajectory.

However, failure of the program would produce adverse reactions. At the same time, the risks of inaction remain greater than those of a carefully considered and well-designed attempt. Lebanon’s current situation is already catastrophic: five wars have occurred over 36 years, with $20 billion in cumulative damages, a collapsed economy, and an armed project that reconstitutes itself after every round.

Lebanon’s situation today is conducive to attempting to implement the program. What helps is that Lebanon is in a phase of transition, while Iran is in a phase of weakness. The negative factor is the current status quo.