🇷🇺 Statement by Ambassador-at-Large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Andrey Belousov under Agenda Item 24 of the 70th Session of the IAEA General Conference «Transfer of the nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT»

📍Vienna, 18 September 2026

💬 For the fifth consecutive session of the General Conference, we have been discussing the issue of the transfer of highly enriched uranium from the United Kingdom and the United States to Australia under AUKUS for use in the nuclear propulsion systems of submarines. We are grateful to China for its consistent efforts to ensure an intergovernmental discussion of this issue at the General Conference and the IAEA Board of Governors.

Russia has consistently proceeded from the view that the «submarine» component of AUKUS represents an unprecedented challenge both to the IAEA safeguards system and to the entire nuclear non-proliferation and arms control regime. This situation cannot but give rise to the most serious concerns and requires an appropriate response from the international community.

The AUKUS partners maintain that their future submarines will be conventionally armed rather than nuclear-armed. We take note of these assurances. However, even if the parties do not currently intend to equip the submarines with nuclear weapons, this by no means means that their position cannot change in the future. SSN-AUKUS submarines are technically capable of carrying strategic warheads, and in the United States they are openly considered as potential delivery platforms for such weapons. Moreover, should a corresponding decision be taken, all the necessary infrastructure for this purpose will already have been established in Australia. As we can see from open sources, the military development of Australian territory by the United States and the United Kingdom is proceeding at full speed.

At the same time, Australia’s adherence to its obligations under the Treaty of Rarotonga establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific also raises questions. A military contingent is being deployed on Australian territory, and infrastructure for the weapons of nuclear-weapon States is being constructed. U.S. nuclear-powered submarines are calling at Australian bases for maintenance as part of the deployment of the Submarine Rotational Force at HMAS Stirling. All this calls into question the justification for providing «negative» security assurances to Australia as a non-nuclear-weapon State under the NPT and a member of the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

All of the above leads us to conclude that the further development of the AUKUS partnership risks undermining stability in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, and could trigger a new round of the arms race.

All this activity, indicating the very real possibility of nuclear weapons eventually being deployed on Australian territory, creates conditions for Canberra’s involvement in arrangements and practices involving joint nuclear missions along the lines of NATO. There can be no doubt that such a scenario would have a destabilizing impact on security in the Asia-Pacific region and would significantly increase the existing risks of nuclear proliferation.

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