As these systems were increasingly adopted by what Dunlop called “operational and middle managers,” he led a series of projects to see if IBM could create terminals and management information systems that could be productively used by IBM’s “top executives.” The systems would allow the executives to make strategic decisions for the company in new ways afforded by the computer. His initial efforts all failed.

First, Dunlop experimented with providing high-ranking executives—VPs and the like— with typewriter terminals directly linked to real-time data, financial models, and summary documents about the firm. The terminals went untouched, quickly migrating to the desks of the executives’ secretaries.

Dunlop then tried using IBM’s new CRT-based terminal, the 2250, with a simplified keypad for input. The result was unchanged. Through interviews and surveys, he concluded that the failure was due to the executives’ “self-role concept.” They held themselves to be “very high status” decision-makers who got information from subordinates; any direct use of a typewriter or keyboard would “demean” them.

From his failed experiments, Dunlop concluded that the state-of-the-art in computing technology was inadequate for creating a terminal-based management system for top management. However, those same top managers had noticed that middle managers around the firm had established “war rooms,” in which staff integrated information from all the various terminal-based systems: messaging, text, and database. At IBM corporate headquarters, the top executives wanted a war room of their own.

В статье ещё чуть больше деталей, но остальное вроде бы более известно.