🇷🇺 Statement by Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna Mikhail Ulyanov on the agenda item 6 (c) of the session of the IAEA Board of Governors "Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic"

📍Vienna, September 9, 2026

💬 We note the efforts of IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi, as well as those of the team of experts from the Department of Safeguards, headed by Deputy Director General Massimo Aparo, in carrying out safeguards activities in Syria and in preparing the report entitled “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic”. We would like to make the following observations.

The Director General’s report makes it clear that, having received all the necessary information and access from Syria, and following its assessment of all safeguards-relevant information available to it, the Agency was able to clarify and resolve the outstanding safeguards issues previously reported to the Board of Governors.

At the same time, the work carried out by the Secretariat in recent years inevitably brings us back to the circumstances in which the Syrian “file” was brought before the IAEA. This history must not be forgotten, precisely in the interests of ensuring that safeguards activities remain reliable and depoliticized.

In 2007, the facility at Deir ez-Zor was destroyed in an Israeli military strike. Israel resorted to the use of force, thereby violating the territorial integrity of sovereign Syria, instead of promptly bringing the information at its disposal to the attention of the IAEA. In 2008, only eight months later, another country provided the Agency with intelligence concerning the facility in question, without ever explaining the reasons for the delay in transmitting that information. This is where it all began.

The 2011 resolution finding Syria in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement was based on biased, unreliable and contradictory assessments by the IAEA Secretariat. In its analysis, the Secretariat relied on intelligence provided by third countries, which already contained conclusions that had effectively been drawn in advance, on satellite imagery with gaps in its chronology, as well as on a body of circumstantial evidence and assumptions. The Agency did not rely on what mattered most — the results of its own safeguards verification activities and information provided by Syria itself.

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Against this background, it is regrettable that the Board of Governors has had to spend sixty sessions and hundreds of hours of work on a fruitless, repetitive discussion of the Syrian issue. We stated from the outset that there was no point in keeping this matter on the agenda. Its consideration could have been deferred, allowing Syria and the Secretariat to work without unnecessary political pressure and for the matter to be revisited at any time. However, the Western majority on the Board of Governors decided otherwise, driven by a desire to use the IAEA safeguards system as an instrument of political pressure against a sovereign State.

The Russian Federation continues to pursue a consistent policy aimed at removing the item entitled “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic” from the agenda of the Board of Governors. We support the initiative of the Arab members of the Board — Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Saudi Arabia — to assist in restoring the normal cooperation between our friendly Syria and the IAEA, and we have no objection to the draft resolution before us. It is time to turn this page once and for all.

We proceed from the understanding that all remaining issues can be addressed and resolved in the course of routine safeguards implementation in Syria. As we understand it, the Agency shares this view. We hope that, going forward, the Secretariat will act in accordance with its mandate and in strict compliance with the provisions of the IAEA Statute and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

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