Qubes OS

View the full list of known bugs affecting Qubes 4.3 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20state%3Aopen%20type%3ABug%20label%3Aaffects-4.3%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20cannot%20reproduce%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20declined%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20duplicate%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20not%20applicable%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20self-closed%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20upstream%20issue%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20website%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20infrastructure%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20tests%22) in our issue tracker (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/introduction/issue-tracking.html).

What’s a release candidate?

A release candidate (RC) is a software build that has the potential to become a stable release, unless significant bugs are discovered in testing. RCs are intended for more advanced (or adventurous!) users who are comfortable testing early versions of software that are potentially buggier than stable releases. You can read more about Qubes OS supported releases (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/supported-releases.html) and the version scheme (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/developer/releases/version-scheme.html) in our documentation.

What’s a patch release?

The Qubes OS Project uses the semantic versioning (https://semver.org/) standard. Version numbers are written as [major].[minor].[patch]. Hence, we refer to releases that increment the third number as “patch releases.” A patch release does not designate a separate, new major or minor release of Qubes OS. Rather, it designates its respective major or minor release (in this case, 4.3) inclusive of all updates up to a certain point. See our supported releases (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/supported-releases.html) for a comprehensive list of major and minor releases and our version scheme (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/developer/releases/version-scheme.html) documentation for more information about how Qubes OS releases are versioned.

Qubes OS 4.3.2-rc1 is available for testing
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/18/qubes-os-4-3-2-rc1-available-for-testing/

The first release candidate (RC) for Qubes OS 4.3.2 is now available for testing. This patch release aims to consolidate all the security patches, bug fixes, and other updates that have occurred since the release of Qubes 4.3.1.

What’s new in Qubes 4.3.2?


Default Fedora template upgraded to Fedora 44
kernel-latest upgraded to Linux 7.2
Numerous bug fixes (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues?q=is%3Aissue%20is%3Aclosed%20reason%3Acompleted%20type%3ABug%20label%3A%22affects-4.3%22%20closed%3A2026-06-11..2026-09-18%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20cannot%20reproduce%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20declined%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20duplicate%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20not%20applicable%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20self-closed%22%20-label%3A%22R%3A%20upstream%20issue%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20website%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20infrastructure%22%20-label%3A%22C%3A%20tests%22)


When is the stable release?

That depends on the number of bugs discovered in this RC and their severity. As explained in our release schedule (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/developer/releases/version-scheme.html#release-schedule) documentation, our usual process after issuing a new RC is to collect bug reports, triage the bugs, and fix them. If warranted, we then issue a new RC that includes the fixes and repeat the process. We continue this iterative procedure until we’re left with an RC that’s good enough to be declared the stable release. No one can predict with certainty, at the outset, how many iterations will be required (and hence how many RCs will be needed before a stable release), but we tend to get a clearer picture of this as testing progresses.

Since the changes between 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 are relatively minor, we currently don’t anticipate any major problems requiring a second RC. We currently expect to be able to publish the stable 4.3.2 release around the end of September.

How to test Qubes 4.3.2-rc1

If you’d like to help us test (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html) this RC, the best way to do so is by performing a clean installation (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/installation-guide.html) with the new ISO (https://www.qubes-os.org/downloads/). As always, we strongly recommend making a full backup (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-back-up-restore-and-migrate.html) beforehand and updating Qubes OS (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html) immediately afterward in order to apply all available bug fixes.

As an alternative to a clean installation, there’s also the option of performing an in-place upgrade without reinstalling. However, since Qubes 4.3.2 is a patch release, it’s essentially Qubes 4.3 inclusive of all updates to date, which largely amounts to just using a fully-updated 4.3 installation. By contrast, a clean installation covers other areas that could also benefit from testing, such as the installation procedure, which is why it’s the recommended testing method.

Regardless of your testing method, please help us improve the eventual stable release by reporting any bugs you encounter (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/introduction/issue-tracking.html). If you’re an experienced user, we encourage you to join the testing team (https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/joining-the-testing-team/5190).

Known issues in Qubes OS 4.3.2

It is possible that templates restored in 4.3.2 from a pre-4.3 backup may continue to target their original Qubes OS release repos. This does not affect fresh templates on a clean 4.3.2 installation. For more information, see issue #8701 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/8701).

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7FJjE0wu8mKT3on0o6RLlifo7mXl1lmXZM6YcB1QD0+/zod0Q6c=
=Zo3p
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: qsb-119-2026.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/2504a9d8fe7979eadaa933359da0981a3c14a7de/QSBs/qsb-119-2026.txt.sig.simon)

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.

What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?

A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security.html#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them.

Why should I care about QSBs?

QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?

A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?

A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#openpgp-software).)



Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1


(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)


View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494

part of the file name in most cases. And even when they do control the
full path, many users would likely find such a path suspicious, which
would likely make it more difficult for an attacker to successfully
trick the user into opening such a path.

Discussion
-----------

Normally, we do not issue Qubes security bulletins for purely "in-VM"
vulnerabilities (like this one) that do not involve crossing the VM
security boundary. However, we have decided to make an exception in this
case, since this is a bug in our code and since qvm-open-in-vm is
specifically intended to operate on untrusted input.

While qvm-open-in-vm is designed to be hardened, keep in mind that
handling less trusted data in a more trusted VM still can be risky for
other reasons, for example:

- Unsafe handling of attacker-controlled paths is an easy mistake to
make in the shell.
- A file explorer could render the thumbnail of an untrusted file with
a buggy parser.
- You might accidentally open the file with an application other than
qvm-open-in-vm, exposing the full attack surface of that application.

Patching
---------

The following package contains the security update that addresses the
vulnerability described in this bulletin:

For Qubes 4.3, in affected templates and standalones:
- qubes-core-agent version 4.3.48

This package will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository over the next two weeks after being tested
by the community. [2] Once available, the package should be installed
via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]

In order for this security update to take effect, all affected templates
must be updated with the package above, then shut down. Afterward, all
qubes based on these templates (including disposables) must be
restarted. All affected standalones must be updated with the package
above.

Credits
--------

This vulnerability was first reported by Giulio Berra. Shortly after, it
was independently reported by Rafal Wojtczuk.

References
-----------

[1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html
[2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/



Source: qsb-119-2026.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/2504a9d8fe7979eadaa933359da0981a3c14a7de/QSBs/qsb-119-2026.txt)

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmqpVWsACgkQ1lWk8hgw
4GqZXQ//bjrYeDHG0AF5Zute1i8YgJD1TbvLAmI3wXDe5xJKL+gNhHyguqh3qtP3
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1zW4QSBIUd4yEl4B+tH5ZMB3pacSbTQsW1SCTU3I428meTFJW6yjN4cPNruHF2lH
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=yTNV
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: qsb-119-2026.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/2504a9d8fe7979eadaa933359da0981a3c14a7de/QSBs/qsb-119-2026.txt.sig.marmarek)

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQIzBAABCgAdFiEE6hjn8EDEHdrv6aoPSsGN4REuFJAFAmqpXmAACgkQSsGN4REu
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k8KBdBGw+FJ3Zt4583fW3DwKVJlbtp7SEpQG8HMswU+SHQBKclR+ceye/uwMzoej

QSB-119: Potential attacker-controlled format string in qvm-open-in-vm
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/15/qsb-119/

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 119: Potential attacker-controlled format string in qvm-open-in-vm (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/2504a9d8fe7979eadaa933359da0981a3c14a7de/QSBs/qsb-119-2026.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.

Qubes Security Bulletin 119


---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 119 ]===---

2026-09-15

Potential attacker-controlled format string in qvm-open-in-vm

User action
------------

Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.

Summary
--------

Under certain circumstances (see "Technical details" below), if the user
invokes qvm-open-in-vm (either directly or through the "Edit in
disposable qube" GUI integration) on a file with an attacker-controlled
filename or path, the attacker might be able to execute code in the qube
in which the user invoked qvm-open-in-vm.

Impact
-------

An attacker who successfully exploits this vulnerability can take
control over the qube in which the user invoked qvm-open-in-vm.

Affected systems
-----------------

All supported Qubes OS releases are affected. Among official Qubes OS
templates, only Debian templates are affected.

Technical details
------------------

When qvm-open-in-vm is invoked with a file (not an URI), the source-side
part of the qrexec call is handled by the qopen-in-vm helper program.
After sending the file content to the other side, qopen-in-vm tries to
open a temporary file alongside the original file in order to save the
response in case the user has edited the file in the target qube. If
creating this file fails (e.g., because the directory is read-only),
qopen-in-vm creates a temporary file in /tmp and shows an error message
to the user. When printing this error message, it incorrectly invokes
the gui_nonfatal function, such that the original filename ends up in a
printf format string, which is unsafe.

For this vulnerability to be exploitable, multiple conditions must be
fulfilled:

1. The attacker must trick the user into using qvm-open-in-vm to open a
file that either
a. has a filename (i.e., the last component of the file's path)
longer than 248 bytes or
b. is located in a directory that is not writable.

2. The path (but not necessarily its last component) must
contain printf-style conversion specifiers (such as '%n').

3. qvm-open-in-vm must not have been invoked with the --view-only flag.

4. The target qube must either
a. send back the file content because its mtime changed (which
usually happens because the user saved the file being edited,
even if merely by overwriting it with the same content) or
b. be compromised by the attacker.

5. The build of qvm-open-in-vm must have been compiled without
_FORTIFY_SOURCE hardening enabled (or set to a level below 2). Due
to an unfortunate interaction between our build script and the way
Debian handles this option, this hardening was not enabled for our
Debian packages. (This problem did not affect our Fedora packages,
for which the hardening was correctly enabled.) With enabled
hardening, the program safely aborts with an error, making the bug
unexploitable.

The first person to report this vulnerability tested its exploitability
on his system. He found that it was successfully exploited in less than
3 % of attempts. Moreover, his demonstration required a very long path
with multiple nested directories and that contained many format
specifiers. In the real world, the attacker may control only the last

What are some signs of an unhealthy canary?

Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:


Dead canary. In each canary, we state a window of time during which you should expect the next canary to be published. If no canary is published within that window of time and no good explanation is provided for missing the deadline, then the canary has died.
Missing statement(s). Canaries include a set of numbered statements at the top. These statements are generally the same across canaries, except for specific numbers and dates that have changed since the previous canary. If an important statement was present in older canaries but suddenly goes missing from new canaries with no correction or explanation, then this may be an indication that the signers can no longer truthfully make that statement.
Missing signature(s). Qubes canaries are signed by the members of the Qubes security team (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security.html#qubes-security-team) (see below). If one of them has been signing all canaries but suddenly and permanently stops signing new canaries without any explanation, then this may indicate that this person is under duress or can no longer truthfully sign the statements contained in the canary.


Does every unexpected or unusual occurrence related to a canary indicate something bad?

No, there are many canary-related possibilities that should not worry you. Here is a non-exhaustive list of examples:


Unusual reposts. The only canaries that matter are the ones that are validly signed in the Qubes security pack (qubes-secpack) (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security-pack.html). Reposts of canaries (like the one in this announcement) do not have any authority (except insofar as they reproduce validly-signed text from the qubes-secpack). If the actual canary in the qubes-secpack is healthy, but reposts are late, absent, or modified on the website, mailing lists, forum, or social media platforms, you should not be concerned about the canary.
Last-minute signature(s). If the canary is signed at the last minute but before the deadline, that’s okay. (People get busy and procrastinate sometimes.)
Signatures at different times. If one signature is earlier or later than the other, but both are present within a reasonable period of time, that’s okay. (For example, sometimes one signer is out of town, but we try to plan the deadlines around this.)
Permitted changes. If something about a canary changes without violating any of the statements in prior canaries, that’s okay. (For example, canaries are usually scheduled for the first fourteen days of a given month, but there’s no rule that says they have to be.)
Unusual but planned changes. If something unusual happens, but it was announced in advance, and the appropriate statements are signed, that’s okay (e.g., when Joanna left the security team and Simon joined it).


In general, it would not be realistic for an organization to exist that never changed, had zero turnover, and never made mistakes. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect such events to occur periodically, and it would be unreasonable to regard every unusual or unexpected canary-related event as a sign of compromise. For example, if something usual happens with a canary, and we say it was a mistake and correct it (with valid signatures), you will have to decide for yourself whether it’s more likely that it really was just a mistake or that something is wrong and that this is how we chose to send you a subtle signal about it. This will require you to think carefully about which among many possible scenarios is most likely given the evidence available to you. Since this is fundamentally a matter of judgment, canaries are ultimately a social scheme, not a technical one.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany canaries?

corresponding qubes-secpack.git repo tags. [2]

[2] Don't just trust the contents of this file blindly! Verify the
digital signatures! Instructions for doing so are documented here:
https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security-pack.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/



Source: canary-048-2026.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/f1378920daaaad3e338fa18aa972da074bc45aef/canaries/canary-048-2026.txt)

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

iQIzBAABCAAdFiEELRdx/k12ftx2sIn61lWk8hgw4GoFAmqhJaEACgkQ1lWk8hgw
4GpAUA//dvesbc30xLrZ5hRrJgPBBOaMIXjLZk2il/EljKLAMLdPOk5Y01kNLLGS
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v3p+pKqLNFe0GU64KUlt3Fvc0m4hyvxPZbmzA/UOevMzssX5BHkRXQDJaknLppy+
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gTyhd0+s9RfyWDdA2l1ZvG10t1Pz5SIJecPXHFMk+F6qHEpjezI=
=wcFj
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: canary-048-2026.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/f1378920daaaad3e338fa18aa972da074bc45aef/canaries/canary-048-2026.txt.sig.marmarek)

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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KasUPBOWrZh99IFonBCAUY5dFJScujtOWh/nihbX531nnV7X1XkUc2rieaW7zGye
brxjG4s3h4/r6IfH3K38cCLw3m5luvSmOm0F1zt9xthnUp7PnNK+qOOkPNzWptsA
upPVS/rjPlfAm01GDU+aqWVpv4kF74TGTMnQj112eRz+LyEnrx9LWqJZ4YsrvgYP
OsrCPnfCPF0fgNsKKbMJ12b17rIXGXw/aKEqL/V3XVJUKbaGTlJU8GbBsQG7a1oD
JpEWdU7I7RR40UXwGHNUnS5bSCVdAhlNEs/tnyWW2zEScAkZXu/wJTGaPA6wcTkd
l1Um8S7H4Q2rRTCMGziJHjTUjdlMegcjrkEmHOzM3r78fCsZJgY=
=vexT
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: canary-048-2026.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/f1378920daaaad3e338fa18aa972da074bc45aef/canaries/canary-048-2026.txt.sig.simon)

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes canary has been published.

What is a Qubes canary?

A Qubes canary (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/canary/) is a security announcement periodically issued by the Qubes security team (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security.html#qubes-security-team) consisting of several statements to the effect that the signers of the canary have not been compromised. The idea is that, as long as signed canaries including such statements continue to be published, all is well. However, if the canaries should suddenly cease, if one or more signers begin declining to sign them, or if the included statements change significantly without plausible explanation, then this may indicate that something has gone wrong.

The name originates from the practice in which miners would bring caged canaries into coal mines. If the level of methane gas in the mine reached a dangerous level, the canary would die, indicating to miners that they should evacuate. (See the Wikipedia article on warrant canaries (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warrant_canary) for more information, but bear in mind that Qubes Canaries are not strictly limited to legal warrants.)

Qubes Canary 048
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/09/canary-048/

We have published Qubes Canary 048 (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/f1378920daaaad3e338fa18aa972da074bc45aef/canaries/canary-048-2026.txt). The text of this canary and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below. For an explanation of this announcement and instructions for authenticating this canary, please see the end of this announcement.

Qubes Canary 048


---===[ Qubes Canary 048 ]===---


Statements
-----------

The Qubes security team members who have digitally signed this file [1]
state the following:

1. The date of issue of this canary is September 09, 2026.

2. There have been 118 Qubes security bulletins published so far.

3. The Qubes Master Signing Key fingerprint is:

427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494

4. No warrants have ever been served to us with regard to the Qubes OS
Project (e.g. to hand out the private signing keys or to introduce
backdoors).

5. We plan to publish the next of these canary statements in the first
fourteen days of December 2026. Special note should be taken if no new
canary is published by that time or if the list of statements changes
without plausible explanation.


Special announcements
----------------------

None.


Disclaimers and notes
----------------------

We would like to remind you that Qubes OS has been designed under the
assumption that all relevant infrastructure is permanently compromised.
This means that we assume NO trust in any of the servers or services
which host or provide any Qubes-related data, in particular, software
updates, source code repositories, and Qubes ISO downloads.

This canary scheme is not infallible. Although signing the declaration
makes it very difficult for a third party to produce arbitrary
declarations, it does not prevent them from using force or other means,
like blackmail or compromising the signers' laptops, to coerce us to
produce false declarations.

The proof of freshness provided below serves to demonstrate that this
canary could not have been created prior to the date stated. It shows
that a series of canaries was not created in advance.

This declaration is merely a best effort and is provided without any
guarantee or warranty. It is not legally binding in any way to anybody.
None of the signers should be ever held legally responsible for any of
the statements made here.


Proof of freshness
-------------------

Wed, 09 Sep 2026 06:09:30 +0000

Source: DER SPIEGEL - International (https://www.spiegel.de/international/index.rss)
Fake Jewish Lineage: The Passport Scheme that Exploited Germany’s Nazi History
BYD, Geely, Xpeng: Germany’s Vaunted Auto Industry in Dire Straits Amid Chinese Surge
Amodei vs. Altman: How the Race for AI Dominance Is Increasing the Risks
Boats from Eastern Libya: How Europe Is Bowing to a Libyan Warlord on Migration
Moaning for the Mainland: How Taiwan Satisfies China's Lust for Pornography

Source: NYT > World News (https://rss.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/nyt/World.xml)
AfD’s Far Right Win Puts New Pressure on Germany’s Leader Merz
Chinese Ship Takes Arctic Shortcut: Smart Business? Or a Political Flex?
Israeli Allies Ban Trade With Settlements as U.K. Cites ‘Ethnic Cleansing’
Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthis Edge Back to the Brink of War
Carney Says Retaliation Against U.S. Tariffs Was Unavoidable

Source: BBC News (https://feeds.bbci.co.uk/news/world/rss.xml)
US strikes Iranian oil tankers as Tehran targets American base in Jordan
Paul Adams: British-Israeli relations at lowest ebb in decades
US slaps import ban on Canadian alcohol, motorbikes and other goods
'Constantly on my mind' - 9/11 agony endures for bereaved, 25 years on
South Park creators rename show 'South America' in apparent dig at Trump

Source: Blockchain.info
000000000000000000017721d9b2add64d85980a3bb8587851798bb854c3d514


Footnotes
----------

XSAs released on 2026-09-08
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/09/08/xsas-released-on-2026-09-08/

The Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) has released one or more Xen security advisories (XSAs) (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/).
The security of Qubes OS is not affected.

XSAs that DO affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS:


(none)


XSAs that DO NOT affect the security of Qubes OS

The following XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS, and no user action is necessary:


XSA-509 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-509.html): Denial of service only.
XSA-510 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-510.html): Denial of service only.
XSA-511 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-511.html): Qubes OS does not use XSM silo.
XSA-512 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-512.html): Qubes OS does not use oxenstored.
XSA-513 (https://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-513.html): Qubes OS does not use tapdisk.


About this announcement

Qubes OS uses the Xen hypervisor (https://wiki.xenproject.org/wiki/Xen_Project_Software_Overview) as part of its architecture (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/developer/system/architecture.html). When the Xen Project (https://xenproject.org/) publicly discloses a vulnerability in the Xen hypervisor, they issue a notice called a Xen security advisory (XSA) (https://xenproject.org/developers/security-policy/). Vulnerabilities in the Xen hypervisor sometimes have security implications for Qubes OS. When they do, we issue a notice called a Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/). (QSBs are also issued for non-Xen vulnerabilities.) However, QSBs can provide only positive confirmation that certain XSAs do affect the security of Qubes OS. QSBs cannot provide negative confirmation that other XSAs do not affect the security of Qubes OS. Therefore, we also maintain an XSA tracker (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/xsa/), which is a comprehensive list of all XSAs publicly disclosed to date, including whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS. When new XSAs are published, we add them to the XSA tracker and publish a notice like this one in order to inform Qubes users that a new batch of XSAs has been released and whether each one affects the security of Qubes OS.

jaJGgXzD/QntiNiWH1iaB7NxeZJPzKGg8O7MPUvQV4Cn02uoE5J5EY8XZrGhNPVl
D4HHrQb+dMrwImEAGovHMdqVPJIiTGRFm5umwpKK8NRVWGjpsu8=
=fHjz
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: qsb-118-2026.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/f65082c8211a421ed15a59219d6e54e93289fafb/QSBs/qsb-118-2026.txt.sig.marmarek)

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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=1/K/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----


Source: qsb-118-2026.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/f65082c8211a421ed15a59219d6e54e93289fafb/QSBs/qsb-118-2026.txt.sig.simon)

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.

What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?

A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security.html#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them.

Why should I care about QSBs?

QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?

A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?

A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#openpgp-software).)



Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created

27 program_invocation_short_name, buf, strerror(errno)) < 0) {
28 fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate memory for error message :(\n");
29 return;
30 }
31 #undef KDIALOG_CMD
32 #undef ZENITY_CMD
33 fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", buf);
34 system(dialog_cmd);
35 }
36
37 _Noreturn void gui_fatal(const char *fmt, ...) {
38 va_list args;
39 va_start(args, fmt);
40 display_error(fmt, args);
41 va_end(args);
42 exit(1);
43 }

The problem is that `sanitize_remote_filename()` removes only non-ASCII
characters (and double quotation marks) but leaves shell meta-characters
in place. Then, `system()` runs the constructed command, including the
attacker-controlled name via the shell.

Note that the VM variant of `qvm-copy-to-vm` is not affected, as its
version of the error reporting function does not use `system()`:

core-agent-linux/qubes-rpc/gui-fatal.c:

16 static void produce_message(const char *type, const char *fmt, va_list args)
17 {
...
31 if (progress_type && !strcmp(progress_type, "gui"))
32 {
33 switch (fork())
34 {
35 case -1:
36 exit(1); // what else
37 case 0:
38 if (geteuid() == 0) {
39 if (setuid(getuid()) != 0) {
40 perror("setuid failed, not calling zenity/kdialog");
41 exit(1);
42 }
43 }
44 fix_display();
45 execlp("/usr/bin/zenity", "zenity", "--error", "--text", dialog_msg, NULL);
46 execlp("/usr/bin/kdialog", "kdialog", "--sorry", dialog_msg, NULL);
47 exit(1);
48 default:;
49 }
50 }
51 free(dialog_msg);
52 }
53
54 void gui_fatal(const char *fmt, ...)
55 {
56 va_list args;
57 va_start(args, fmt);
58 produce_message("Fatal error", fmt, args);
59 va_end(args);
60 exit(1);
61 }

Affected systems
-----------------

All Qubes OS releases are affected.

Patching
---------

The following package contains the security update that addresses the
vulnerability described in this bulletin:

For Qubes 4.3, in dom0:
- qubes-core-dom0-linux, version 4.3.22

This package will migrate from the security-testing repository to the
current (stable) repository after a short period of testing by the
community. [2] Once available, the package should be installed via the
Qubes Update tool or its command-line equivalents. [1]

Credits
--------

The vulnerability was discovered by Tim C.

References
-----------

[1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html
[2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/



Source: qsb-118-2026.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/f65082c8211a421ed15a59219d6e54e93289fafb/QSBs/qsb-118-2026.txt)

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
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QSB-118: Dom0 arbitrary code execution in qvm-copy-to-vm error reporting
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/08/29/qsb-118/

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 118: Dom0 arbitrary code execution in qvm-copy-to-vm error reporting (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/f65082c8211a421ed15a59219d6e54e93289fafb/QSBs/qsb-118-2026.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.

Qubes Security Bulletin 118


---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 118 ]===---

2026-08-28

Dom0 arbitrary code execution in qvm-copy-to-vm error reporting

User action
------------

Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.

Summary
--------

If `qvm-copy-to-vm` is used to copy a file from dom0 to a malicious
qube, that qube can inject an arbitrary command into dom0.

Impact
-------

If an attacker has compromised a qube, and if the user initiates a
`qvm-copy-to-vm` call from dom0 to the compromised qube, then the
attacker can exploit this vulnerability in order to inject an arbitrary
command into dom0, which allows the attacker to take control of
Qubes OS.

Technical details
------------------

The `qvm-copy-to-vm` tool allows copying files from dom0 to a specified
qube. It uses the "qfile" protocol, which is a simplified archive
format, including simple file metadata (much simpler than `tar` or
`cpio`). The protocol also includes transfer confirmation at the end,
which is sent by the target back to the source. This confirmation
includes a checksum of all the transferred files, an error code (if
any), and the name of the last received file. In the case of an error,
as reported by the error code field, dom0 displays a GUI message that
includes the error information and the name of the affected file, as
reported by the target qube. The vulnerability exists in the processing
of that file name:

1. The `wait_for_result()` function calls `sanitize_remote_filename()`
on the received name before passing it to the error handler:

linux-utils/qrexec-lib/pack.c:

55 static void sanitize_remote_filename(char *untrusted_filename)
56 {
57 for (; *untrusted_filename; ++untrusted_filename) {
58 if (*untrusted_filename < ' ' ||
59 *untrusted_filename > '~' ||
60 *untrusted_filename == '"')
61 *untrusted_filename = '_';
62 }
63 }
64
65 void wait_for_result(void)
66 {
...
98 /* sanitize the remote filename */
99 sanitize_remote_filename(last_filename);
100
101 errno = hdr.error_code;
102 if (hdr.error_code != 0) {
103 switch (hdr.error_code) {
104 case EEXIST:
105 call_error_handler("A file named \"%s\" already exists in QubesIncoming dir", last_filename);
106 break;
...

2. Then, `call_error_handler()` calls the dom0 variant of the error
reporting function -- `gui_fatal()` -> `display_error()`, which uses
`system()` to launch the actual error dialog:

core-admin-linux/file-copy-vm/qfile-dom0-agent.c:

15 void display_error(const char *fmt, va_list args) {
16 char *dialog_cmd;
17 char buf[1024];
18 struct stat st_buf;
19 int ret;
20
21 (void) vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
22 ret = stat("/usr/bin/kdialog", &st_buf);
23 #define KDIALOG_CMD "kdialog --title 'File copy/move error' --sorry "
24 #define ZENITY_CMD "zenity --title 'File copy/move error' --warning --text "
25 if (asprintf(&dialog_cmd, "%s '%s: %s (error type: %s)'",
26 ret==0 ? KDIALOG_CMD : ZENITY_CMD,

A PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy) signature is a cryptographic digital signature (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_signature) made in accordance with the OpenPGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy#OpenPGP) standard. PGP signatures can be cryptographically verified with programs like GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) (https://gnupg.org/). The Qubes security team cryptographically signs all QSBs so that Qubes users have a reliable way to check whether QSBs are genuine. The only way to be certain that a QSB is authentic is by verifying its PGP signatures.

Why should I care whether a QSB is authentic?

A forged QSB could deceive you into taking actions that adversely affect the security of your Qubes OS system, such as installing malware or making configuration changes that render your system vulnerable to attack. Falsified QSBs could sow fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the security of Qubes OS or the status of the Qubes OS Project.

How do I verify the PGP signatures on a QSB?

The following command-line instructions assume a Linux system with git and gpg installed. (For Windows and Mac options, see OpenPGP software (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#openpgp-software).)



Obtain the Qubes Master Signing Key (QMSK), e.g.:

$ gpg --fetch-keys https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc
gpg: directory '/home/user/.gnupg' created
gpg: keybox '/home/user/.gnupg/pubring.kbx' created
gpg: requesting key from 'https://keys.qubes-os.org/keys/qubes-master-signing-key.asc'
gpg: /home/user/.gnupg/trustdb.gpg: trustdb created
gpg: key DDFA1A3E36879494: public key "Qubes Master Signing Key" imported
gpg: Total number processed: 1
gpg: imported: 1


(For more ways to obtain the QMSK, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).)


View the fingerprint of the PGP key you just imported. (Note: gpg> indicates a prompt inside of the GnuPG program. Type what appears after it when prompted.)

$ gpg --edit-key 0x427F11FD0FAA4B080123F01CDDFA1A3E36879494
gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.27; Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.
There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.


pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key

gpg> fpr
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494 2010-04-01 Qubes Master Signing Key
Primary key fingerprint: 427F 11FD 0FAA 4B08 0123 F01C DDFA 1A3E 3687 9494



Important: At this point, you still don’t know whether the key you just imported is the genuine QMSK or a forgery. In order for this entire procedure to provide meaningful security benefits, you must authenticate the QMSK out-of-band. Do not skip this step! The standard method is to obtain the QMSK fingerprint from multiple independent sources in several different ways and check to see whether they match the key you just imported. For more information, see How to import and authenticate the Qubes Master Signing Key (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/verifying-signatures.html#how-to-import-and-authenticate-the-qubes-master-signing-key).

Tip: After you have authenticated the QMSK out-of-band to your satisfaction, record the QMSK fingerprint in a safe place (or several) so that you don’t have to repeat this step in the future.


Once you are satisfied that you have the genuine QMSK, set its trust level to 5 (“ultimate”), then quit GnuPG with q.

gpg> trust
pub rsa4096/DDFA1A3E36879494
created: 2010-04-01 expires: never usage: SC
trust: unknown validity: unknown
[ unknown] (1). Qubes Master Signing Key

[7] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01441.html
[8] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01442.html
[9] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/blob/main/releasenote.md#microcode-20260812

--
The Qubes Security Team
https://www.qubes-os.org/security/



Source: qsb-117-2026.txt (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/2fae4b5eb43fae0b3bd58cc50444aac283d702fb/QSBs/qsb-117-2026.txt)

Marek Marczykowski-Górecki (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#marek-marczykowski-g%C3%B3recki)’s PGP signature

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Source: qsb-117-2026.txt.sig.marmarek (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/2fae4b5eb43fae0b3bd58cc50444aac283d702fb/QSBs/qsb-117-2026.txt.sig.marmarek)

Simon Gaiser (aka HW42) (https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#simon-gaiser-aka-hw42)’s PGP signature

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Source: qsb-117-2026.txt.sig.simon (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/2fae4b5eb43fae0b3bd58cc50444aac283d702fb/QSBs/qsb-117-2026.txt.sig.simon)

What is the purpose of this announcement?

The purpose of this announcement is to inform the Qubes community that a new Qubes security bulletin (QSB) has been published.

What is a Qubes security bulletin (QSB)?

A Qubes security bulletin (QSB) (https://www.qubes-os.org/security/qsb/) is a security announcement issued by the Qubes security team (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/project-security/security.html#qubes-security-team). A QSB typically provides a summary and impact analysis of one or more recently-discovered software vulnerabilities, including details about patching to address them.

Why should I care about QSBs?

QSBs tell you what actions you must take in order to protect yourself from recently-discovered security vulnerabilities. In most cases, security vulnerabilities are addressed by updating normally (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html). However, in some cases, special user action is required. In all cases, the required actions are detailed in QSBs.

What are the PGP signatures that accompany QSBs?

QSB-117: Intel CPU firmware vulnerabilities
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/08/28/qsb-117/

We have published Qubes Security Bulletin (QSB) 117: Intel CPU firmware vulnerabilities (https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-secpack/blob/2fae4b5eb43fae0b3bd58cc50444aac283d702fb/QSBs/qsb-117-2026.txt). The text of this QSB and its accompanying cryptographic signatures are reproduced below, followed by a general explanation of this announcement and authentication instructions.

Qubes Security Bulletin 117


---===[ Qubes Security Bulletin 117 ]===---

2026-08-28

Intel CPU firmware vulnerabilities

User action
------------

Continue to update normally [1] in order to receive the security updates
described in the "Patching" section below. No other user action is
required in response to this QSB.

Summary
--------

On 2026-08-11, Intel published "microcode-20260811 Release," [3] which
is associated with several Intel security advisories. Among these
security advisories, we suspect the following may apply to Qubes OS:

- "2026.3 IPU, Intel Processor Load Value Injection Zero Data Advisory"
(INTEL-SA-01423) [4]
- "Intel Processor Firmware Advisory - 01428" (INTEL-SA-01428) [5]
- "Intel Processor Firmware Advisory - 01435" (INTEL-SA-01435) [6]
- "2026.3 IPU, Intel Processor Firmware Advisory" (INTEL-SA-01441) [7]
- "2026.3 IPU, Intel Xeon Processor Firmware Advisory"
(INTEL-SA-01442) [8]

Unfortunately, these advisories do not provide sufficient information
for us to make a definitive assessment about the extent to which these
vulnerabilities affect the security of Qubes OS. Based on the limited
information available, we cannot exclude possibility of a cross-qube
attack.

Impact
-------

On affected systems, an attacker who has managed to compromise one qube
can attempt to exploit these vulnerabilities in order to infer data
belonging to other qubes or escalate their privileges.

Affected systems
-----------------

Only systems with one of the following Intel CPUs are affected by at
least some of the advisories:

- 10th Generation Intel Core
- 11th Generation Intel Core
- Intel Core Ultra, Series 1 to 3
- various Xeon variants

For a more detailed list of affected products see Intel's advisories.

Note: As of this writing, Intel has withdrawn the relevant update for
Meteor Lake (Intel Core Ultra Series 2) CPUs "due to functional issues"
[9]. Due to limited information, the impact of the vulnerabilities
discussed in this bulletin on systems without the relevant update is
unclear.

Patching
---------

The following package contains the security update that addresses the
vulnerability described in this bulletin:

For Qubes 4.3, in dom0:
- microcode_ctl version 2.1.20260812

Note: This package has already finished migrating from the
security-testing repository to the current (stable) repository after
being tested by the community. [2] (This QSB is being published later
than usual.) The package, which is already available to all users,
should be installed via the Qubes Update tool or its command-line
equivalents. [1]

Dom0 must be restarted afterward in order for the update to take effect.

If you use Anti Evil Maid, you will need to reseal your secret
passphrase to new PCR values, as PCR18+19 will change due to the new
microcode updates.

Credits
--------

See Intel's advisories.

References
-----------

[1] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/how-to-guides/how-to-update.html
[2] https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/user/downloading-installing-upgrading/testing.html
[3] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/blob/main/releasenote.md#microcode-20260811
[4] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01423.html
[5] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01428.html
[6] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01435.html

If you or your organization are interested in sponsoring Qubes OS Summit 2026 or becoming a Qubes Partner (https://www.qubes-os.org/partners/), please contact us at funding@qubes-os.org (mailto:funding@qubes-os.org).

Code of conduct

This event is covered by the Qubes OS Project’s code of conduct (https://doc.qubes-os.org/en/latest/introduction/code-of-conduct.html).

Qubes OS Summit 2026: Proposals closing soon; tickets still available!
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/08/22/qubes-os-summit-2026-proposals-closing-soon-tickets-still-available/

As previously announced (https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2026/07/23/qubes-os-summit-2026-tickets-for-sale-and-speaker-proposals-now-open/), the call for proposals (https://pretalx.com/qubes-os-summit-2026/cfp) for Qubes OS Summit 2026 (https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/) will end on 2026-08-31. If you’d like to present at the Summit, please submit your proposal soon! As a reminder:


You may present either on site or virtually from anywhere in the world.
If your proposal is accepted and you wish to present in person, you’ll be issued an on-site ticket free of charge, no purchase necessary.
If you select “Don’t record this session” when submitting your proposal, your presentation will not be livestreamed or recorded. Online attendees will not be able to view it.


When and where

Friday, October 30 @ 9:30 AM — Sunday, November 1 @ 3:00 PM (GMT+1)

(A more specific schedule will be published after the speaker lineup is finalized.)

Refugio Berlin (https://refugio.berlin/)

Lenaustraße 3-4

12047 Berlin

View on OpenStreetMap (https://www.openstreetmap.org/way/263350430)

Attend in person or online

There are three ways to attend the Summit:


In person at Refugio Berlin (https://refugio.berlin/)

Requires a paid on-site ticket (https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/)
Grants access to the hackathon (including interactive workshops) and any design sessions (depending on conference schedule)
Provides the opportunity to socialize, network, and mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
Grants exclusive access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
Grants access to attend presentations and participate as a live audience member


Actively participate online

Requires a free virtual ticket (https://pretix.eu/qubes/summit2026/)
For those who are presenting remotely
For those who are attending presentations remotely and wish to ask questions or engage in active discussion in a live chat during the presentations
Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions
Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member


Passively view online

No ticket or registration required
For those who simply wish to watch the presentations via the public livestream and recorded videos
Does not provide the ability to ask questions or engage in active discussion during the presentations
Does not grant access to the hackathon or any design sessions
Does not provide the opportunity to socialize, network, or mingle with like-minded individuals who are passionate about secure computing
Does not grant access to any non-livestreamed, non-recorded presentations (see below)
Does not grant access to attend presentations as a live audience member




Note: As mentioned above, presenters have the option to request that their presentations not be recorded. If a presenter opts out of recording, there will be a “no recording” icon next to that presentation in the conference schedule. Only on-site attendees will be able to view that presentation. It will not be livestreamed or recorded for later viewing.

Conference schedule

We’re still reviewing proposals from prospective presenters, so the list of talks has not been decided yet. We’ll publish a detailed conference schedule after the speaker lineup has been finalized.

Become a sponsor

All previous messages missed for an entire year has been recovered and posted here. Sorry for any inconveniences.

Xen 4.22: Strengthening Open Source Virtualization for Cloud, Embedded, and Automotive Systems
https://xenproject.org/blog/xen-4-22-release/

Xen 4.22 adds modern hardware support, Arm improvements, continued RISC-V progress, Xenstore scalability updates, and a five-year security support lifecycle.

Original message:
t.me/QubesOS/1099