⚠️ Russian Security Services Adapting Operations to Wartime Conditions and Increased Restrictions

⚠️ The Estonian International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) has published a report by researcher Sansiro Hosaki, titled "Adapting to War: The Evolution of Russia's Intelligence Ecosystem," which examines the changes in the roles of Russian intelligence and counterintelligence agencies since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022. According to the author, the priorities of Russian security services have shifted towards directly supporting military objectives, conducting external operations, and strengthening internal control, while also adapting to restrictions, expulsions of personnel from Western countries, and increased counterintelligence pressure

ℹ️ The report specifically addresses the expansion of the Federal Security Service (FSB)'s foreign activities. According to ICDS, the FSB's Fifth Service, after losing opportunities for political intelligence in Ukraine, has maintained a significant role in occupation administrations and has intensified operations in Europe, allegedly aimed at disrupting military support for Kyiv

ℹ️ At the same time, the report states that the FSB has been granted additional powers within Russia, including access to private databases without court orders, the ability to suspend the operation of telecommunications and internet services, and the authority to approve international scientific cooperation

ℹ️ The Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), according to the author's assessment, is reallocating resources to work in countries of the Global South and is more actively using open-source intelligence operations. Special attention is paid to the activities of Kirill Dmitriev, who, according to the report, uses informal channels to establish direct contacts with the American administration, bypassing traditional diplomatic and intelligence structures. In Africa, Moscow, as noted, is expanding the use of political technology networks previously associated with Yevgeny Prigozhin, promoting the image of Russia as a force that opposes colonialism and defends traditional values

ℹ️ Military intelligence – the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR, GRU) – in the picture presented by the author, has also expanded its range of tasks: from military intelligence gathering to sabotage, assassinations, psychological operations, and circumventing sanctions. ICDS points to the use of criminal and other intermediaries linked to the GRU for operations in Europe, as well as the development of units focused on unconventional operations abroad. The author specifically writes about the transformation of Unit 29155 into the Special Operations Directorate and the creation of Center 795, which, according to the report, is responsible for operations involving assassinations and kidnappings outside of Russia and is directly subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff

ℹ️ A separate section is devoted to the FSB's Military Counterintelligence Department (DVKR). According to ICDS, its activities are used not only to control the armed forces but also as a tool in internal political struggles surrounding the Ministry of Defence and investigations against high-ranking military officials. At the same time, the author believes that the effectiveness of such anti-corruption investigations is limited and politicized, and the inability to prevent several assassinations of Russian generals is a source of tension between the military and security structures

ℹ️ The overall result of these changes, the author says, is a shift in the Russian intelligence system towards more active use of illegal intelligence, foreign nationals, cultural and scientific channels, and operations directly from Russian territory. At the same time, according to ICDS, there is an increased coordination between different structures and a redistribution of influence between political groups within the Kremlin. The author characterizes the Russian intelligence system as adaptive and capable of taking significant risks, but points to its vulnerabilities – the personalization of decision-making, corruption, and nepotism, which, according to his assessment, may limit the effectiveness of the intelligence cycle
https://icds.ee/en/adapting-to-war-the-evolution-of-russias-intelligence-ecosystem/

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