⚡️Gaza Civil Defense:
Our crews recovered members of the Qazaat family from under the rubble of their home in Tal al-Hawa, south of Gaza City, after three years.
Post #213086
1.23K
- 😭 7
Channel Public Channel
WA WarfareAnalysis News 🔻
@warfareanalysis
- Subscribers
- 31.4K
- Photos
- 73.5K
- Videos
- 55.9K
- Links
- 9K
Showing posts older than #213087 · Back to latest
Older Posts 16 shown
Post #213085
1.26K
⚡️Gaza sources:
Mohsen Ahmed Mustafa Bahja has died of his wounds after he was shot in the head by an Israeli quadcopter drone in northern Gaza Strip.
Mohsen Ahmed Mustafa Bahja has died of his wounds after he was shot in the head by an Israeli quadcopter drone in northern Gaza Strip.
- 🤬 18
- 😭 9
- 🏆 1
Post #213084
1.32K
⚡️Gaza sources:
The child Ismail al-Bardawil was killed by Israeli army gunfire to the chest in al-Mawasi, Rafah, southern Gaza, moments ago.
The child Ismail al-Bardawil was killed by Israeli army gunfire to the chest in al-Mawasi, Rafah, southern Gaza, moments ago.
- 🤬 23
- 😭 6
- 👍 1
Post #213083
1.32K
⚡️Gaza sources:
Israeli naval shelling targeted tents of displaced families in al-Shati refugee camp, west of Gaza City, wounding a number of displaced.
Israeli naval shelling targeted tents of displaced families in al-Shati refugee camp, west of Gaza City, wounding a number of displaced.
- 🤬 18
- 👍 2
Post #213082
1.33K
⚡️Gaza sources:
The Israeli army is firing heavily and carrying out artillery shelling in central Gaza.
The Israeli army is firing heavily and carrying out artillery shelling in central Gaza.
- 🤬 17
- 🏆 2
Post #213081
1.3K
⚡️Gaza sources:
Israeli artillery shelling targeted the Abu al-Rous family home in Block 12, east of al-Bureij refugee camp in central Gaza, wounding two Palestinians and setting the home on fire.
Israeli artillery shelling targeted the Abu al-Rous family home in Block 12, east of al-Bureij refugee camp in central Gaza, wounding two Palestinians and setting the home on fire.
- 🤬 17
- 🤣 1
Post #213080
1.22K
⚡️Gaza Ambulance and Emergency Services:
9 Palestinians were wounded by Israeli army gunfire outside Israeli-controlled areas in Khan Younis and al-Bureij refugee camp in the Gaza Strip.
9 Palestinians were wounded by Israeli army gunfire outside Israeli-controlled areas in Khan Younis and al-Bureij refugee camp in the Gaza Strip.
- 🤬 16
- 😭 3
- 💯 1
Post #213078
1.19K
WarfareAnalysis News 🔻 Pakistani army bombs Afghanistan Afghan media: Pakistani military carried out airstrikes on the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, targeting civilian areas in Nurgal district of Kunar and Barmal district of Paktika early this morning, Monday Local officials…
⚡️Afghan sources:
The Pakistani bombing that targeted residential homes in eastern Afghanistan killed one man and two women and seriously wounded three men and a child.
The Pakistani bombing that targeted residential homes in eastern Afghanistan killed one man and two women and seriously wounded three men and a child.
- 🤬 27
- ❤ 1
- 🤣 1
Post #213077
1.1K
⚡️Gaza sources:
The Israeli army opened fire toward tents of displaced families along Salah al-Din Street between al-Bureij and al-Maghazi, wounding a woman and a child. The woman is in serious condition.
The Israeli army opened fire toward tents of displaced families along Salah al-Din Street between al-Bureij and al-Maghazi, wounding a woman and a child. The woman is in serious condition.
- 🤬 4
- 😭 3
- 👍 1
Post #213076
1.13K
⚡️ IRGC:
“We shot down a U.S MQ-1 drone over the Strait of Hormuz.”
“
We warn that any new attack will push Tehran to change the geography of the war and the types of weapons it uses.”
- 🤬 1
Post #213074
1.15K
Pakistani army bombs Afghanistan
Afghan media: Pakistani military carried out airstrikes on the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, targeting civilian areas in Nurgal district of Kunar and Barmal district of Paktika early this morning, Monday
Local officials in Kunar said 3 civilians were killed and several others wounded in an airstrike on a residential home in Nurgal.
Pakistani airstrikes also targeted a shop and an empty house in Barmal district of Paktika.
Afghan media: Pakistani military carried out airstrikes on the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, targeting civilian areas in Nurgal district of Kunar and Barmal district of Paktika early this morning, Monday
Local officials in Kunar said 3 civilians were killed and several others wounded in an airstrike on a residential home in Nurgal.
Pakistani airstrikes also targeted a shop and an empty house in Barmal district of Paktika.
- 😡 22
- ❤ 4
- 🤣 1
Post #213073
1.06K
What Does Saudi Arabia Want From Yemen?
Part 1:
Part2:
Part3:
Part 1:
https://t.me/WarfareAnalysis/213070
Part2:
https://t.me/WarfareAnalysis/213071
Part3:
https://t.me/WarfareAnalysis/213072
- ❤ 3
- 🤣 2
Post #213072
1.02K
The question is: What do we want, and who has the authority to say it in our name?
Until we answer that question ourselves, everything we write about Riyadh will remain an explanation of our own incapacity, rather than an analysis of its policy.
- Written by Yemeni journalist and researcher Fahd Sultan - translated from Arabic.
Until we answer that question ourselves, everything we write about Riyadh will remain an explanation of our own incapacity, rather than an analysis of its policy.
- Written by Yemeni journalist and researcher Fahd Sultan - translated from Arabic.
- 👍 3
- ⚡ 2
- 🤣 2
Post #213071
1.06K
The truth revealed by ten years of fighting is that Saudi Arabia entered the war in 2015 not because it had a project for Yemen, but because it had lost its old network there.
The collapse of the “Special Committee” and its network after 2011 is what pushed Riyadh toward the fighter jets after it had previously been content with the "envelope". And whoever lacks a project cannot achieve victory, regardless of the size of his budget. This is the first secret of the war: it was not a war of one project against another. It was the war of a state trying to restore a tool of control it had lost.
The second secret is even more stark: Saudi Arabia wants a Yemen that is weak but not collapsed, stable but not strong. This is an impossible equation. The weak do not remain stable, and the collapsed cannot be controlled. Ten years of war were not a failure of implementation; they were a failure to define the objective. And we Yemenis paid the price for an equation that no one could fulfill.
We saw this contradiction clearly at the end of 2025, when Riyadh issued a public statement expressing regret over pressure by the UAE on the Southern Transitional Council to push its forces into Hadramawt and al-Mahra. It described the move as extremely dangerous and a threat to its national security, then followed the statement with a strike on a military shipment at the port of Mukalla.
Consider the scene carefully: an ally strikes an ally. Anyone who believes the anti-Houthi camp is a single camp should read that statement twice.
Today, as we are in September 2026, everything built since the Saudi initiative of 2021, the roadmap announced by the UN envoy in December 2023, and the Amman rounds last April has collapsed.
The bombing has returned, missiles have once again reached deep into Saudi territory, hundreds have been killed within weeks, and the Houthis have advanced toward Bab al-Mandab. Once again, we will be told that this is the beginning of a decisive resolution. I say with confidence: this is not the beginning of a resolution. It is a return to the point where we began, at a new cost.
And here lies the central point I want to make to my Yemeni reader without flattery. We oscillate between two interpretations, both of which absolve us of responsibility.
The first sees Saudi Arabia as a permanent conspiracy that has been plotting to fragment us since Taif. The second sees it as a benevolent sister awaiting good behavior from us so that it may rescue us. The first comforts us because it explains our failure through an external power we cannot resist. The second comforts us because it transfers the burden of finding a solution to someone else’s pocket. Both lead us to the same place: doing nothing.
The reality is simpler and harsher than either interpretation. Saudi Arabia is a state that protects its borders and acts according to calculations of its own self-interest, like any state. It has never been inherently more evil or more benevolent than that.
Yemen does not rank first or second among its priorities, and this fact alone explains Saudi Arabia’s fluctuations more than all conspiracy theories combined. When Riyadh pulled back from Yemen after 2022, it was not betrayal; it was calculation. And when it returned this year, it was not responding to us; it was defending Yanbu and Khamis Mushait.
The conclusion I want to put clearly before the reader is this: the true determinant of the relationship between Yemen and Saudi Arabia has never been Saudi intent, but Yemeni absence.
Whenever there was a state in Sanaa, the relationship was negotiable, and both sides spoke the language of interests. Whenever the state collapsed, Yemen was transformed from a neighbor into a file, and from a party into an arena.
Taif was not signed with an absent nation. It was signed with a defeated state, but a state that nevertheless existed. Today, however, we demand that our neighbor treat us as a state when we ourselves have not yet agreed on who represents us.
The question, then, is not: What does Saudi Arabia want from us?
Part 2/3
The collapse of the “Special Committee” and its network after 2011 is what pushed Riyadh toward the fighter jets after it had previously been content with the "envelope". And whoever lacks a project cannot achieve victory, regardless of the size of his budget. This is the first secret of the war: it was not a war of one project against another. It was the war of a state trying to restore a tool of control it had lost.
The second secret is even more stark: Saudi Arabia wants a Yemen that is weak but not collapsed, stable but not strong. This is an impossible equation. The weak do not remain stable, and the collapsed cannot be controlled. Ten years of war were not a failure of implementation; they were a failure to define the objective. And we Yemenis paid the price for an equation that no one could fulfill.
We saw this contradiction clearly at the end of 2025, when Riyadh issued a public statement expressing regret over pressure by the UAE on the Southern Transitional Council to push its forces into Hadramawt and al-Mahra. It described the move as extremely dangerous and a threat to its national security, then followed the statement with a strike on a military shipment at the port of Mukalla.
Consider the scene carefully: an ally strikes an ally. Anyone who believes the anti-Houthi camp is a single camp should read that statement twice.
Today, as we are in September 2026, everything built since the Saudi initiative of 2021, the roadmap announced by the UN envoy in December 2023, and the Amman rounds last April has collapsed.
The bombing has returned, missiles have once again reached deep into Saudi territory, hundreds have been killed within weeks, and the Houthis have advanced toward Bab al-Mandab. Once again, we will be told that this is the beginning of a decisive resolution. I say with confidence: this is not the beginning of a resolution. It is a return to the point where we began, at a new cost.
And here lies the central point I want to make to my Yemeni reader without flattery. We oscillate between two interpretations, both of which absolve us of responsibility.
The first sees Saudi Arabia as a permanent conspiracy that has been plotting to fragment us since Taif. The second sees it as a benevolent sister awaiting good behavior from us so that it may rescue us. The first comforts us because it explains our failure through an external power we cannot resist. The second comforts us because it transfers the burden of finding a solution to someone else’s pocket. Both lead us to the same place: doing nothing.
The reality is simpler and harsher than either interpretation. Saudi Arabia is a state that protects its borders and acts according to calculations of its own self-interest, like any state. It has never been inherently more evil or more benevolent than that.
Yemen does not rank first or second among its priorities, and this fact alone explains Saudi Arabia’s fluctuations more than all conspiracy theories combined. When Riyadh pulled back from Yemen after 2022, it was not betrayal; it was calculation. And when it returned this year, it was not responding to us; it was defending Yanbu and Khamis Mushait.
The conclusion I want to put clearly before the reader is this: the true determinant of the relationship between Yemen and Saudi Arabia has never been Saudi intent, but Yemeni absence.
Whenever there was a state in Sanaa, the relationship was negotiable, and both sides spoke the language of interests. Whenever the state collapsed, Yemen was transformed from a neighbor into a file, and from a party into an arena.
Taif was not signed with an absent nation. It was signed with a defeated state, but a state that nevertheless existed. Today, however, we demand that our neighbor treat us as a state when we ourselves have not yet agreed on who represents us.
The question, then, is not: What does Saudi Arabia want from us?
Part 2/3
- ❤ 3
- ⚡ 1
- 🤣 1
Post #213070
1.19K
What Does Saudi Arabia Want From Yemen?
It can be said with confidence that this is the wrong question, one on which we have wasted twenty years.
There is probably no Yemeni of my generation who has not heard this question, or asked it himself at least once, at a qat gathering or in a public place, or heard it on television or from the mouth of a political analyst, or read it in a newspaper or on a website.
What does Saudi Arabia want from us? We ask it as though we are searching for a hidden intention, as though uncovering it would solve the puzzle. After years of following this issue, I believe that the question itself lies at the root of our analytical problem. We ask about intent, when in reality the problem is structural.
Let us begin where we should begin: Riyadh does not conduct a foreign policy toward Yemen. And this is an important point to understand. It manages an internal security file.
This is not a rhetorical phrase, but an institutional description. For decades, the Yemen file was not handled by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by the “Special Committee for Yemeni Affairs,” which was headed by Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz. It was a committee that paid salaries to Yemeni sheikhs, officers, journalists, and religious scholars. It was not buying loyalty; it was buying behavior. Whoever understands the difference between the two understands half of our modern history with our northern neighbor.
The second point is geography. Geography, not conspiracy, created this arrangement.
The Kingdom’s longest land border is its border with us, stretching more than 1,300 kilometers across mountains, deserts, and tribes extending across both sides.
This border was legally demarcated twice: through the Treaty of Taif on May 20, 1934, following the defeat of Imam Yahya, and then through the Treaty of Jeddah on June 12, 2000. Yet the border remained a space for negotiation rather than simply a dividing line, because what crosses it is not armies, but people, weapons, goods, and influence.
From this comes a principle that many of us Yemenis refuse to grasp: Saudi Arabia does not view northern Yemen as a neighboring state in the full sense of the term. Rather, it views it as an extension of its own tribal hinterland. Dealing with an extension is therefore different from dealing with a state.
Then come demographics and poverty as secondary considerations. We are more numerous, poorer, and too close to be ignored.
This disparity produced chronic anxiety in Riyadh, while also giving it one of its most effective tools: the labor market. In 1990, when Saleh took his position on the invasion of Kuwait, hundreds of thousands of Yemeni workers were expelled within weeks.
The figures commonly cited range from 700,000 to one million, estimates for which there is no precise count. But the number is not what matters. What matters is that Riyadh discovered that day that economics could take effect faster than an army, while we discovered that proximity could be turned into collective punishment with a single decision. Thirty years have passed, and both sides still behave according to the lesson they learned that year.
Here we must also dispel another comforting illusion that we frequently repeat: the illusion of permanent sectarian hostility. It is often said that Saudi Arabia is a permanent doctrinal enemy of Zaydism. This claim does not withstand history.
In 1962, Riyadh backed the Zaydi royalists against the republicans, who were a mixture of Shafiis and Zaydis, because the threat at the time was Nasserist nationalism, not sectarianism. In the 1980s, it funded Salafi expansion in Saada because the threat had changed. For Riyadh, sectarian identity is a tool invoked when needed and set aside when it is not, rather than a doctrine governing its decisions. Anyone who builds his analysis on the assumption of permanent sectarian hostility will be surprised every time.
Then came the war, exposing what we had concealed from ourselves.
Part 1/3
It can be said with confidence that this is the wrong question, one on which we have wasted twenty years.
There is probably no Yemeni of my generation who has not heard this question, or asked it himself at least once, at a qat gathering or in a public place, or heard it on television or from the mouth of a political analyst, or read it in a newspaper or on a website.
What does Saudi Arabia want from us? We ask it as though we are searching for a hidden intention, as though uncovering it would solve the puzzle. After years of following this issue, I believe that the question itself lies at the root of our analytical problem. We ask about intent, when in reality the problem is structural.
Let us begin where we should begin: Riyadh does not conduct a foreign policy toward Yemen. And this is an important point to understand. It manages an internal security file.
This is not a rhetorical phrase, but an institutional description. For decades, the Yemen file was not handled by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but by the “Special Committee for Yemeni Affairs,” which was headed by Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz. It was a committee that paid salaries to Yemeni sheikhs, officers, journalists, and religious scholars. It was not buying loyalty; it was buying behavior. Whoever understands the difference between the two understands half of our modern history with our northern neighbor.
The second point is geography. Geography, not conspiracy, created this arrangement.
The Kingdom’s longest land border is its border with us, stretching more than 1,300 kilometers across mountains, deserts, and tribes extending across both sides.
This border was legally demarcated twice: through the Treaty of Taif on May 20, 1934, following the defeat of Imam Yahya, and then through the Treaty of Jeddah on June 12, 2000. Yet the border remained a space for negotiation rather than simply a dividing line, because what crosses it is not armies, but people, weapons, goods, and influence.
From this comes a principle that many of us Yemenis refuse to grasp: Saudi Arabia does not view northern Yemen as a neighboring state in the full sense of the term. Rather, it views it as an extension of its own tribal hinterland. Dealing with an extension is therefore different from dealing with a state.
Then come demographics and poverty as secondary considerations. We are more numerous, poorer, and too close to be ignored.
This disparity produced chronic anxiety in Riyadh, while also giving it one of its most effective tools: the labor market. In 1990, when Saleh took his position on the invasion of Kuwait, hundreds of thousands of Yemeni workers were expelled within weeks.
The figures commonly cited range from 700,000 to one million, estimates for which there is no precise count. But the number is not what matters. What matters is that Riyadh discovered that day that economics could take effect faster than an army, while we discovered that proximity could be turned into collective punishment with a single decision. Thirty years have passed, and both sides still behave according to the lesson they learned that year.
Here we must also dispel another comforting illusion that we frequently repeat: the illusion of permanent sectarian hostility. It is often said that Saudi Arabia is a permanent doctrinal enemy of Zaydism. This claim does not withstand history.
In 1962, Riyadh backed the Zaydi royalists against the republicans, who were a mixture of Shafiis and Zaydis, because the threat at the time was Nasserist nationalism, not sectarianism. In the 1980s, it funded Salafi expansion in Saada because the threat had changed. For Riyadh, sectarian identity is a tool invoked when needed and set aside when it is not, rather than a doctrine governing its decisions. Anyone who builds his analysis on the assumption of permanent sectarian hostility will be surprised every time.
Then came the war, exposing what we had concealed from ourselves.
Part 1/3
- ❤ 7
- 🤣 2
- ⚡ 1
Post #213067
1.32K
⚡️Syrian sources:
A Syrian army arms depot “exploded” in the al-Eis area in the southern Aleppo countryside, sending projectiles flying in several directions
Such “explosions” at Syrian army weapons depots have become increasingly frequent in recent months, with several similar “incidents” recorded across Syria.
A Syrian army arms depot “exploded” in the al-Eis area in the southern Aleppo countryside, sending projectiles flying in several directions
Such “explosions” at Syrian army weapons depots have become increasingly frequent in recent months, with several similar “incidents” recorded across Syria.
- 🤬 17
- 🤣 7
- 😭 3
- ❤ 1