R.Politik

Five points that help explain Moscow’s current approach to Ukraine.

1. Time is not really on Russia’s side. The claim that “time is on Putin’s side” is only partly true. The war was never designed to last this long: it is costly and carries mounting political and financial risks. Putin needs to end it sooner rather than later, but only on his terms. It would be more accurate to say that time is not on Ukraine’s side. That, however, does not mean it will become easier for Putin to achieve his goals.

2. While Putin wants to negotiate with the Americans, he is also prepared to talk to Ukrainians — but not to Zelensky. This is a long-standing idea: to reach an agreement with Ukrainian military figures or anyone else he regards as more pragmatic. That intention remains and may grow stronger as disappointment with the American side increases.

3. Russian officials are uncomfortable dealing with Steve Witkoff, but they have no comparable alternative channel. Moscow therefore prefers to invest fully in these contacts for as long as no such alternative is available.

4. There is currently no opening proposal attractive enough to Putin that any outside actor, above all the Americans, could realistically put forward. Moscow may nevertheless appear receptive to an initial draft because it expects to reshape it through painstaking bargaining over the wording, sequencing and implementation of each component. Russian officials calculate that detailed negotiations could gradually bring any eventual settlement closer to what they would regard as an acceptable deal.

5. Europe is increasingly becoming Moscow’s central strategic problem, overshadowing the United States, Ukraine and, to some extent, even NATO. This will shape the nature of negotiations with and about Ukraine, as well as the outcome of any settlement, far more than it did a year ago. It is likely to dominate European geopolitics for decades.

The war in Ukraine is entering a more dangerous phase of multilateral escalation, with few remaining guardrails. Ukrainian attacks are reaching deeper into Russia, Moscow is intensifying strikes on Ukraine and pressure on its maritime trade, and European support is becoming more directly connected to Kyiv’s capacity to strike Russian territory. Germany’s attribution of the attempted Leipzig airport attack to Moscow, alongside a succession of hybrid and other hostile incidents across Europe, has driven Russian-German relations into a new crisis and increased the risk of the confrontation spilling beyond Ukraine.

At the same time, Washington is making a new attempt to reopen negotiations, even though the positions of Moscow and Kyiv remain barely reconcilable.

Witkoff and Kushner returned to Moscow on 5 September after several months of work by Washington on a potential settlement framework. The disputed issues include territory, security guarantees, Ukraine’s future military capabilities, a possible international presence and the political conditions surrounding a settlement.

Russia’s fundamental terms have not changed, while Ukraine continues to signal that it is ready to keep fighting. Neither Moscow nor Kyiv appears prepared to make a strategic concession. The important questions are whether Putin continues to stand by earlier understandings and whether renewed contacts can produce more than another trilateral meeting.

The new R.Politik Bulletin assesses these questions alongside the military, maritime and Russian-European escalation now shaping the negotiating environment.

Russia’s domestic political system is also becoming less predictable as the first federal parliamentary campaign since the start of the war approaches. Yabloko was initially allowed to participate, only to be removed after the party began to look less politically manageable. The significance lies not simply in Yabloko’s electoral prospects, but in the reversal itself: was this a coherent policy shift, an improvised response to changing circumstances or the result of competing assessments of political risk? The bulletin examines the decision-making behind the party’s dismantling and the implications for the remaining boundaries of legal opposition.

Other developments raise similar questions about how wartime governance is changing. A new decree allows the state to place broadly defined critical infrastructure under temporary management without formally transferring ownership. Its practical application will determine whether it remains a security measure or develops into a wider instrument of corporate control.

The authorities have designated Pavel Durov an extremist while government bodies, businesses and election managers still rely on Telegram. This unresolved contradiction will become particularly important after the election, when the platform’s political utility may begin to change.

The prosecution of charity leader Lida Moniava tests how far social standing and institutional importance can influence the form of state pressure.

In Udmurtia, an unexpected gubernatorial replacement offers a separate indication of the operational and personnel requirements emerging under wartime conditions.

Meanwhile, Russians continue to report relative personal stability while becoming markedly more pessimistic about the country’s future. Business confidence presents a similar picture: limited stabilisation, but at a persistently low level.

R.Politik Bulletin No. 15 (189) examines how these decisions are taken under pressure.

Several Wildberries logistics facilities were attacked in less than a week. The strikes mark a significant expansion of the war into Russia’s civilian consumer economy, directly affecting a platform used by millions of consumers, employees and small businesses.
The damage is highly visible, yet the state has no agreed mechanism for protecting private infrastructure or distributing wartime losses. Companies are expected to manage the consequences, demonstrate social responsibility and avoid placing additional demands on the authorities.

The new R.Politik Bulletin considers how Putin views these losses, how political managers are trying to reconcile them with the official narrative and what happens as businesses and citizens assume responsibilities previously associated with the state.

This matters because the disruption has so far produced practical adaptation rather than politicisation. Sellers are concerned with compensation and the survival of their businesses; public discussion largely avoids the war itself. But how sustainable is this model if Ukrainian attacks continue to reach deeper into civilian economic life? The bulletin sets out the political risks the Kremlin sees, and those it may be overlooking.

The issue also looks at Washington’s preparations for another attempt to revive diplomacy over Ukraine. Moscow’s fundamental position has not changed: it maintains contacts with the American side while increasing military pressure on Kyiv. Yet Russian officials are signalling that Moscow may no longer regard itself as constrained by what it describes as the Anchorage understandings. The practical question is whether the autumn could offer a limited opening for renewed negotiations without any substantive change in the parties’ underlying positions.

Other sections trace the growing maritime confrontation and its implications for Russian and Ukrainian grain exports; the informal mechanisms of political control exposed by the Sobchak correspondence; and the policy dilemma created by sanctions against VK, as pressure for retaliation collides with Russia’s continuing dependence on Western digital infrastructure.

Finally, the treatment of Boris Nadezhdin offers an insight into the Kremlin’s thinking ahead of the State Duma elections. The episode is less about Nadezhdin than about growing risk aversion within the political system, the enforcement of unwritten boundaries and the shrinking tolerance for initiatives that have not been fully authorised.

R.Politik Bulletin No. 14 (188) examines how the Russian state is managing the expanding domestic consequences of the war.

Putin does not believe that Ukraine's strike campaign can break Russian society. He reads it as a Western attempt to make his position fragile, and he is drawing conclusions from that reading which are not the ones being anticipated in Western capitals.

The new R.Politik Bulletin, No. 13 (187), is out today.

The assumption underpinning current Western policy is that mounting pressure will eventually bring Putin to the negotiating table. Trump has said publicly that the strikes on Russian refineries are "an escalation that can help lead to an end". Moscow's reply, and more importantly its private calculation, points the other way. The bulletin sets out what the Kremlin actually concludes from the pressure it is under, why that conclusion produces an incentive to escalate rather than to soften, and where the escalation is most likely to go next as the geography of the war widens.

The fuel crisis has become the central issue of Russian politics, and the authorities are managing it in a way that tells you a great deal about how the system now works under strain. The bulletin explains what is being decided, by whom, and what the Kremlin expects the political cost to be before the September vote.

Andrei Melnichenko's essay in The Economist has been read in incompatible ways: as a declaration of loyalty, as a text written in the presidential administration and merely signed, as a businessman breaking with the war. R.Politik's reading differs from all of them. Even if it changes nothing in practice, the essay may mark the beginning of something consequential for the fate of the regime. The bulletin sets out what it is actually proposing, and who its real addressee is.

The same pressures run through the rest of the issue: Lukashenko's narrowing room for manoeuvre between Moscow and Kyiv; the pre-election congresses and what United Russia's list reveals about the Kremlin's read on its own society; the arrests around the Rotenberg brothers and what is really being contested there; and Moscow's decision to install an outsider in South Ossetia for the first time since 2008.

R.Politik Bulletin No. 13 (187) examines how these decisions are taken under pressure.

The US-Iran memorandum signed in Islamabad is being read in Moscow in two seemingly contradictory ways. The loud version treats it as an American capitulation in the war — confirmation that Washington tried to topple an authoritarian regime but failed, and ended up in a more complicated position than before the war: a sign that US power is in decline despite its military might. The quieter, more realist version acknowledges that stepping back is itself a smart move to correct a mistake, and proof of flexibility — ending the war is in any case better than a militarised destabilisation of the region with nuclear risks.

Moscow's real hope is that a closed Iran file frees Trump to turn back to Ukraine — on terms Russia can shape. The contest with Kyiv and the Europeans for his ear has accordingly been accelerating, with the latter handed a chance during the G7 in Évian to explore an opening and tilt Trump their way. However, much more will depend not on the outcome of this battle but on how Russian-American contacts develop in the coming weeks, how the situation on the front line changes, and whether November's US mid-term elections affect the prospects for resuming peace talks. We explain what Putin is set to undertake over these months.

That external picture sits on top of a domestic one that pulls in a single direction: pressure, not concession. A weeks-long campaign against Russian refineries had already pushed fuel shortages across more than fifty regions; the largest drone strike on Moscow since the war began, on 18 June, sharpened a crisis that was well under way — real strain, but strain the Kremlin reads as a reason to escalate, not to soften its demands.

The same logic of pressure runs inward. A budget-code amendment pushed through the Duma in a single sitting hands the executive freedom to spend and borrow without returning to parliament; the Central Bank, meanwhile, faces unusually open lobbying to make money cheaper. Decision-making is concentrating, as the fiscal room narrows.

The clearest signal of where the system is heading may be the arrest of StPetersburg mogul Ilya Traber — a shadowy figure tied to #Putin's early career. The point is not the man but the precedent: personal connection no longer guarantees protection, and with the security services ascendant, the once-untouchable are now exposed.

Against that backdrop, the unblocking of Roblox stands out as a rare concession to public mood ahead of September's elections — we answer whether it marks a pre-election "thaw" or an exceptional decision, based on the specific nuances.

The polls capture the tension precisely: his rating decline has halted at a slightly lower level, while fear of the drone attacks climbs fast towards the centre of public attention.

If you follow how Russia actually makes decisions under pressure — where it bends, where it hardens, and why — the full analysis is in R.Politik Bulletin No. 12 (186).

Armenia has held an election that became a new geopolitical test for Russia: whether it has learnt the lessons of its failed relationships with the former Soviet states, how the decision-making unfolded, and why, once again, Moscow resorted to old coercive tactics despite past setbacks. No surprise — the overt pressure lifted Pashinyan's rating and helped him to the result that secures an absolute majority in parliament. For the Kremlin that creates an incentive not to recognise the legitimacy of the vote and to keep up the pressure, betting on escalation rather than normalisation.

What stands out is how contentious this has become inside Russia. Analysts close to the authorities have warned, at times emotionally, that Moscow is repeating the mistakes it made with #Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova — alienating a long-standing partner and, by interfering so visibly, consolidating the very leader it set out to weaken. Yet the decision-making system and the way the regime functions prevent that common sense from taking hold, turning any intention into an amplified, self-harming machine.

I have just released R.Politik Bulletin No. 11 (185), reconstructing the Kremlin's reading of Armenia, the split it has opened within Moscow's own establishment, and what Russia now expects after the vote.

The Armenian case sits inside a wider question of how Russia handles its neighbours. Putin's state visit to Kazakhstan, with the Balkhash nuclear agreement at its centre, was staged as a model relationship — yet it rests on a quieter asymmetry of aims, with Astana cooperating on major projects while keeping its disagreements with Moscow out of public view. The contrast with Armenia, where ties have become saturated with geopolitical meaning, is instructive.

Behind all of it is the war. The issue sets out why the common assumption — that battlefield strain, economic difficulty and domestic pressure are pushing Putin towards an exit — is mistaken. He remains convinced that Russia is winning, that the Donbas will be taken in time and that there are resources enough to pursue his aims. The domestic costs are nonetheless visible.

At the St Petersburg forum the heads of Russia's largest banks and industrial groups voiced alarm about an "overcooling" economy, while Ukrainian strikes on logistics have caused regional fuel shortages and a marked gap between official reassurance and a far bleaker reading within the pro-war community.

Ahead of September's Duma election, United Russia's primaries served less as a contest than as a test of the system's capacity to arrange the electoral outcome at minimal political cost, drawing together the interests of the presidential administration, United Russia, the governors and even the systemic opposition.

If you follow Russia's strategic recalibrations in the post-Soviet space and at home, the full bulletin is at rpolitik.com.

Putin went to Beijing four days after Trump, and the sequence flattered Moscow only on the surface. Trump had left without a breakthrough; Russia could present itself as China's steadier partner. But the visit produced no Power of Siberia 2 and no significant agreements, and what it confirmed was the asymmetry underneath the friendship: China is now the player whose economy lets Russia keep fighting. Beijing declines to press Putin to end the war while maintaining, in public, that it should end.
The commercial frictions are real — gas price, car imports, the terms of dependence — yet none of it touches the strategic closeness. The partnership deepens precisely as it becomes more one-sided.

I have just released R.Politik Bulletin No. 10 (184), which looks at this and at a sharper question forming at home.

Because the more telling shift this fortnight is internal. With talks paused and Washington waiting to see whether Russia's position weakens, loyalist voices — people who are no one's idea of dissenters — have begun to argue openly that the war cannot be won by military means. Putin is unlikely to move; what matters is that the argument is now sayable, and that speculation about manoeuvring around him has started to circulate.

Against that backdrop Russia staged its largest joint nuclear exercise with Belarus to date — the nuclear card pressed harder precisely as the conventional war offers less.

The domestic machine, meanwhile, is preparing for September. Two border regions, Belgorod and Bryansk, went to a combat general and a technocrat — wartime personnel policy in miniature — while United Russia has been told to campaign in a softer register even as the pressure the Kremlin cannot control keeps building.

If you follow how Russia's strategic choices and its internal politics are starting to pull against each other, the full bulletin is at https://rpolitik.com/bulletin/10-2026/putin-in-china-ukraine-a-shifting-debate-nuclear-exercises-new-governors-in-belgorod-and-bryansk-challenging-elections?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=smm_promo_rp&utm_content=bulletin_page

Russia's 81st Victory Day was the most tense of any in the post-Soviet era. The drastically reduced parade — no hardware on Red Square for the first time in 19 years, a sharply shrunken foreign turnout — was driven by a real fear that Ukraine could disrupt the celebrations. Moscow warned Kyiv of devastating strikes on decision-making centres, briefed Washington, Beijing and New Delhi on the consequences of any disruption, and pushed for the Trump-brokered three-day ceasefire.

The episode exposed the structural bind #Putin is now in. Passivity in the face of mounting Ukrainian strikes erodes his domestic standing; escalation undermines the transactional posture he is trying to maintain with Trump. At the same time the patriotic consensus is visibly cracking — mobile internet shutdowns, a rising tax burden, the spreading reach of drone attacks. Western intelligence leaks and reporting on alleged plotting against Putin amplify a sense of regime fragility. As a coup scenario this is exaggerated, but the gradual fading of Putin's credibility is real.

I have just released R.Politik Bulletin No. 9 (183), examining how Putin is navigating this moment.

On Ukraine, the Russian position has hardened — no trilateral talks before Kyiv withdraws from Donbas — as Trump's attention remains absorbed by Iran and the diplomatic process has waned. Putin made the unusual remark that the war "is coming to an end". We unpack what he actually meant — and whether the end is in fact any closer.

On Iran, Moscow is positioning Russia as a potential mediator with the conservative camp in Tehran — particularly on the uranium stockpile — keeping the door open for the moment when Washington–Tehran talks reach a fuller stalemate.

Domestically, the bulletin looks at how the Ministry of Digital Development is being drawn deeper into the FSB's orbit — against the backdrop of competing factions inside the service itself over who controls the digital sphere. It also covers the Kremlin's leadership experiment in Dagestan, Igor Chaika's unusual and divisive appointment to head Rossotrudnichestvo, and a change of Human Rights Commissioner — Moskalkova's replacement with Lantratova may complicate work with the Ukrainians.

For nearly two years, Russia's political agenda has been dominated by foreign affairs — Ukraine, the Trump diplomacy, Iran, the cycles of negotiation and failure. Over the past few weeks, the centre of gravity has shifted inward. What is emerging is a system simultaneously tightening its grip and losing some of its instinctive coordination.

The viral 18-minute address to #Putin by influencer Victoria Bonya — 30 million views, declarative loyalty combined with the implied accusation that the president has lost control of his apparatus — has triggered the most consequential question now circulating in Moscow: did she act on her own, or was the video orchestrated from inside the system? Whatever its origin, the address has fractured the official response — one faction pushed for prosecution, another quietly acknowledged the legitimacy of her irritation — and forced into the open a deeper division over the FSB-led restriction policy that elites had so far been managing in private.

I have just released R.Politik Bulletin No. 8 (182), examining the Bonya episode in depth — who might be behind it, why the system's response has fractured, and what Putin's own first public reaction to the internet restrictions on 23 April actually signals about the direction of policy.

The economic story is converging with the political one. On 15 April, Putin publicly reprimanded the economic bloc and the Central Bank — an unusual gesture that exposes a deepening contradiction between disinflationary discipline and the cabinet's demand for stimulus. With Mishustin's position now openly questioned ahead of September's #Duma elections, competition over the next government's shape is intensifying. At the same time, after three years of fighting for guarantees against de-privatisation, Russian business has now received them in a visibly circumscribed form: a long-awaited bill that codifies the very exceptions — corruption, extremism, strategic-investment claims — through which asset seizures have actually been carried out, freezing the practice in law rather than rolling it back. The detention of the top management of Eksmo, Russia's largest publisher, in a criminal case formally connected to "LGBT literature", shows how a case that began on ideological grounds can spiral into a direct threat to a sector leader — the kind of siloviki momentum that ideological legislation now generates almost on its own.
September's Duma elections will be the most uncertain in years. Mounting economic pressure, visible public discontent over internet restrictions, and an unpredictable frontline are all converging on the campaign. United Russia has finalised its candidates from the four occupied regions of Ukraine — divided unevenly between symbolic figures, local apparatchiks and externally imposed technocrats — and for the first time, the domestic policy overseers must run a federal election campaign in coordination with the security services and the armed forces, against a backdrop of unprecedented uncertainty. Putin's approval rating, meanwhile, has fallen for seven consecutive weeks to its lowest level since the start of the war.

If you follow how decisions are actually made in #Russia — the elite splits, the trade-offs, the unintended consequences of policies designed to tighten control — the full bulletin is available at https://rpolitik.com/bulletin/8-2026/bonya-s-glamorous-revolt-rattles-kremlin-putin-reprimands-economic-bloc-publicly-eksmo-detentions-hit-book-industry-de-privatisation-bill-codifies-ambiguity-united-russia-lines-up-occupied-regions?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=smm_promo_rp&utm_content=bulletin_page

For the first time since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian elite appears to be on the brink of an internal schism. On the one hand, the Kremlin’s continued use of the war to justify new rounds of repression makes it seem as if it’s business as usual. On the other hand, unhappiness over the recent push for total control of the internet is increasingly visible, with even loyalists starting to publicly criticize the Kremlin and predict revolution.

While each individual act of criticism may seem irrelevant, together they are significant. To use a medical analogy: minor and difficult-to-explain symptoms can be a passing inconvenience—or a sign of life-threatening illness.

https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/04/russia-elites-internal-conflict

Russia's internet is being reshaped in real time. The FSB launched a simultaneous offensive this spring — mass blocking of VPN protocols, pressure on platforms to filter traffic, and the effective blocking of Telegram, now accessible only via VPN. On 3 April, a major banking outage left millions unable to make payments, with cash briefly becoming the only option — and the tightening of digital restrictions may have played a role.

Behind the headlines, however, the picture is more complex. The crackdown has opened visible rifts within the ruling establishment over the pace and scope of restrictions, with the approaching Duma elections raising the political stakes. The policy is being driven by the security bloc, but resistance is coming from unexpected quarters — and Putin's own role in the process is more ambiguous than it appears.

I have just released R.Politik Bulletin No. 7 (181), examining the internet crackdown in depth — who is driving it, who is pushing back, and what the emerging "white list" framework reveals about the kind of internet Russia is actually building.

The bulletin also covers the broader strategic picture. Moscow's reading of the Iran war and the US-Iran negotiations is reinforcing the Kremlin's maximalist stance on Ukraine — with Trump's credibility as a negotiating partner continuing to erode.

At home, the economic pressures of a prolonged war are being managed through increasingly creative mechanisms. At Putin's RSPP congress, the wartime dynamic between the state and big business was on full display — with oligarchs pledging 'voluntary' contributions to the budget in an environment that leaves increasingly little room for economic actors to maintain distance from the Kremlin.

Meanwhile, a new draft AI law is positioning the security services at the centre of Russia's technology future, with Western companies set to be effectively locked out — another front in the broader push for state control over strategic sectors.

The same logic of wartime consolidation is visible in the corporate clash between Rosatom and Delo Group over Russia's largest logistics holding — a dispute that risks escalating well beyond its commercial origins.

And as the September Duma elections approach, the Kremlin is signalling caution: the Central Election Committee has undergone the most conservative renewal in its history — a deliberate choice that speaks to the risks the leadership foresees in a wartime electoral cycle.

Separately, Pashinyan's visit to Moscow laid bare the growing tension in Russian-Armenian relations, with Putin publicly drawing lines on Armenia's Westward drift ahead of parliamentary elections in Yerevan.

The full analysis is available in the new R.Politik Bulletin No. 7 (181)

The Middle East war just dropped an unexpected financial gift on Moscow — but the real drama is unfolding inside Russia.

R.Politik Bulletin No. 6 (180) is out.

IN FOCUS
A major oil supply shock from the Iran conflict has narrowed Urals discounts and given the Kremlin short-term breathing room, helped by the temporary US waiver. Putin is treating it as temporary. The budget crisis isn’t.

Yet the domestic stories are even more striking:

• Moscow hit by sudden selective mobile blackouts where even the official whitelists failed to work, paralysing businesses, officials and daily life while testing new digital control tools.

• A prominent investor suddenly faces extremism charges and asset seizure after a bitter family dispute — a case with surprising reach into the highest levels of the hierarchy.

• The Defence Ministry is quietly recruiting university students into specialised units, creating growing tensions across the education system.

• Siberian farmers — traditionally a loyal base — are protesting serious administrative failures in veterinary services against the backdrop of sanctions, raising uncomfortable questions about political responsibility that could backfire later.

• And the most intriguing of all: well-known state propagandist Ilya Remeslo publicly turns against Putin, sparking feverish speculation about an elite split and powerful figures behind him… before quickly ending up in a psychiatric clinic.

These reports reveal the internal tensions, quiet experiments and elite dynamics you won’t see anywhere else.

The full bulletin is essential reading.

If you follow Russia’s strategic thinking, the interplay between the Middle East conflict and Ukraine, the Telegram situation, or you simply want a detailed, source-based analysis of the factors shaping decisions in Moscow — the full 45-page document is now available at R.Politik.

The Iran war is dominating global headlines — US-Israeli strikes since 28 February, Khamenei assassinated, Mojtaba now Supreme Leader, oil markets volatile over Hormuz threats, and Trump claiming the US is “very far ahead of schedule.”

Public discourse remains focused on the immediate chaos: who gains from rising #oil prices? Is this a strategic distraction for Russia in Ukraine? Will the conflict ultimately damage Western interests more than anyone else? Many analyses continue to emphasize short-term gains for Moscow.

Behind the scenes in Moscow, however, the picture is far more complex and uncertain than these surface-level assessments suggest.

I have just released R.Politik Bulletin No. 5 (179), examining how the Kremlin is actually assessing the situation: the short-term fiscal relief it is receiving, alongside the deeper strategic risks and long-term uncertainties causing genuine concern.

Key elements I highlight:
📌 Short-term fiscal relief. The surge in Brent prices — and the risk of even higher levels if the Strait of Hormuz remains threatened — is helping to close Russia’s budget deficit and replenish reserves. It also creates new opportunities for Russia to leverage energy markets to its advantage.

📌Long-term strategic concerns. Moscow views Trump’s decision to launch strikes as a serious miscalculation, driven by Israeli pressure and overconfidence following the Venezuela operation. Moscow expects that a protracted war risks radicalising Iran, entrenching hardliners, and further destabilising the region. Putin’s restrained response to Khamenei’s assassination — and the deaths of several family members — reflects deep unease over the precedent of targeting a head of state. At the same time, Trump’s recent call to Putin is seen in Moscow as a potential opening for Russia to offer its mediation services, although attempts to engage Gulf states have so far produced limited results.

The central lessons for Moscow are clear: Trump is an unpredictable partner for any negotiated settlement (the so-called “spirit of #Anchorage” is fading), negotiations can serve as cover for military preparations, reliance on allies has clear limits, and sanctions pressure often accompanies military action. The prevailing mood among Russian elites is mixed and contradictory — ranging from a sense that the situation is spiralling into a major mess to cautious hopes that the war in the Middle East could become a serious strategic setback for the US and the “collective West.”

Meanwhile, the conflict is diverting international attention and munitions from Ukraine. While the direct impact on Russian-Ukrainian peace talks remains uncertain, Moscow is preparing for the possibility of additional sanctions, increased US pressure, and a prolonged war — even as it sees potential gains from a weakening Ukrainian position. Moscow has already been seeking to relocate the negotiation process while increasing pressure on Ukraine to withdraw from the Donbas.

On the domestic front, the FSB has prevailed in its long-running confrontation with Telegram. A criminal case has been opened against Pavel Durov for assisting terrorist activity, traffic throttling has intensified, and a full ban inside Russia now appears irreversible — despite broad resistance from elites, the public, and even parts of the military. Current geopolitical developments are creating additional grounds for the FSB to expand its influence in political decision-making.

I also examine the Kremlin’s creation of a new presidential commission on AI. Internal competition is intensifying, reflecting the broader struggle for technological sovereignty and tighter state control over the digital space.

Another significant development is the arrest of Ruslan Tsalikov, a long-time associate of Sergey Shoigu. Despite his high-level connections, he now faces the prospect of a lengthy prison sentence.

This bulletin offers a non-headline perspective on how the Kremlin is recalibrating its foreign and domestic priorities in light of the events in Iran.

A rare situation has emerged in which domestic developments have overshadowed an already fraught international agenda for Russia.

The Kremlin has decided to begin throttling Telegram, the country’s most widely used social media platform for communication and access to information. Although preparations for such a move had been evident, the decision nonetheless came as a shock to many, including senior officials, businesses, and representatives of the pro-war community. The systemic opposition chose to speak out against the measure. While this carries no tangible political weight, it signals emerging discrepancies within the ruling elite. The FSB, which stands behind the decision, was compelled to justify its actions publicly. The measure is highly likely to be implemented, yet it will have a noticeable impact on public sentiment.

In international affairs, the Munich Security Conference was a central event, exposing growing transatlantic tensions and mistrust. This has occurred notwithstanding attempts by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to adopt a conciliatory tone. The discussions have intensified European debates about how to shape the continent’s future security and defence architecture without a dominant US role, and how to manage the Russia threat when Putin is failing to achieve victory in Ukraine yet is still committed to unrealistic objectives. Nuclear issues have moved to the centre of the discourse. Russia has observed these developments with limited interest but increasing concern.

With regard to Ukraine, talks in Geneva have opened a new chapter in diplomatic efforts. For the first time since April 2022, Russia has secured an opportunity to draw Ukraine into negotiations on the political aspects of a settlement — effectively a reproduction of the “Istanbul format” of 2022, to which Moscow has repeatedly referred as its preferred basis. The process, however, shows little sign of progress. Volodymyr Zelensky continues to push for a direct meeting with Putin, a scenario still unacceptable to Moscow. Kyiv faces a particularly difficult position: growing pressure from Washington, hesitant and divided European partners, and a Russia unwilling to abandon its maximalist demands.

Considerable attention has also focused on Armenia amid US Vice President JD Vance’s visit — the highest-ranking US official to ever visit the country. Armenia is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in June, and Russia is expected to seek to weaken the position of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan by supporting his opponents. Moscow appears to underestimate the significance of the intensifying Armenian–American engagement and is likely to double down in order to keep Yerevan within its sphere of geopolitical influence. At the same time, the Kremlin must calibrate its actions carefully so as not to provoke President Donald Trump.

Decision-making logic, internal splits, and the real trade-offs that never make it into open sources — all unpacked in the new R.Politik Bulletin No. 4 (178).

Find out much more on the Kremlin thinking in our latest issue.

As long as Putin is in power, Russia isn’t paralyzed by widespread protests, and there is at least some money left in the budget for weapons, the war will continue. The Kremlin will not make significant concessions even if faced with a protracted financial and economic crisis. Rather, such a crisis, should it arise, would first lead to political change and only then to a revision of the war’s goals by the country’s new leadership.

That means there will be no final settlement either now or in the foreseeable future. Negotiations may intensify, a short-term ceasefire is possible, and documents may even be signed. But overall, this simulation of negotiations can only lead to the simulation of a ceasefire and the simulation of a settlement.

The main source of Russian aggression is a profound mistrust of the West and the firm belief that it intends to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia. As long as this fear persists (and is shared by both the elites and society at large), the war will not end.
https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/02/russia-political-war-continuation

Russian-American relations navigate a delicate phase, with Abu Dhabi trilateral talks yielding no settlement breakthroughs despite U.S. pressure for resolution before summer. Moscow deems Kyiv's sequencing plan unworkable, irritated by Washington's dismissal of prior understandings, new demands on Ukraine and hostile rhetoric in the context of Venezuela, Cuba or Russian oil. We depict these topics in detail in our fresh R.Politik Bulletin, revealing the nuances one won't find in the media.

European engagement ramps up: French diplomat Emmanuel Bonne's unannounced Moscow visit prepares potential Macron-Putin dialogue, yet unofficially the Kremlin dismisses it as substance-free, absent a fundamental European policy shift. Moscow signals openness but harbours deep skepticism.

U.S. proposal for a new nuclear deal including China puts Moscow in an awkward position: dialogue is welcomed in principle, but viewed as unrealistic amid Beijing's refusal and Russia's call for broader inclusion.

Putin's pragmatism emerges in Syrian discussions, supporting interim President al-Sharaa to restore territorial integrity and maintain a modest Russian role via military-technical ties.

Economic pressures surface through asset sales: Domodedovo Airport sold at half value to a state-linked buyer amid investor reluctance.

Lukoil's conditional Carlyle deal freezes proceeds under sanctions, a lesser-evil calculation with rival bids ongoing, betting on future geopolitical relief.

Societal impacts deepen: the state has to significantly restrict the general access to higher education, simultaneously favoring war veterans, heightening inequity perceptions.

Ahead of September Duma elections, Telegram restrictions are seen as inevitable but questioned to avoid voter backlash.

GRU Lt Gen Alexeyev's assassination attempt prompts in Moscow swift Ukraine accusations, exposing security gaps for war-linked figures and setbacks of the FSB, but unlikely to foil the negotiations.

Find out much more on the Kremlin thinking in our latest Bulletin.
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The reaction in Moscow to Emmanuel Bonne’s trip to Russia has been mixed. On the one hand, the very fact of the visit is interpreted as a gradual shift in European attitudes to the conflict, reflecting a reluctant acceptance of the need to engage with Russia. On the other hand, the substance of the trip is still regarded as “hostile”.

For Vladimir Putin, the visit is not about efforts to reconcile the two sides of the conflict. Europe is perceived as being aligned with Ukraine and therefore as a party to the conflict itself. From this perspective, the trip is seen instead as an attempt by Paris to improve its position among Western partners, particularly in relation to Donald Trump and the participants in the so-called coalition of the willing.

However, preparations are reportedly underway for a telephone call between Emmanuel Macron and Vladimir Putin, and it already appears inevitable that Europe is moving towards more consistent engagement with Moscow. The Kremlin is signalling a degree of openness to such contacts but remains deeply sceptical about what Europe can offer, beyond a demand that Russia abandon its objectives in Ukraine—something which, from Moscow’s point of view, appears naive, given that Europe lacks the resources and leverage to compel such a shift.

Over the past two weeks, the geopolitical cycle has intensified and become more volatile. The Maduro extraction was followed by Trump’s forceful threat to annex Greenland, accompanied by sustained pressure on Denmark and other European NATO allies. The chaos at Davos—marked by gloomy interventions from the leaders of Canada and Belgium, unexpected criticism of Europe by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and a series of disrupted meetings—reflected a broader sense of fragmentation in the global order.

In the latest R.Politik bulletin, we examine how Russia is interpreting and positioning itself within this evolving context. While Trump’s modus operandi—characterised by force, pressure, blackmail, and incompetence—is undoubtedly alarming to Moscow, it also creates significant tactical openings. The Kremlin has adjusted its position on both the Greenland claim and Trump’s Board of Peace initiative, carefully balancing strategic interests with potential situational gains.

Amid these shifts, a new round of discussions on the war in Ukraine has begun. The first Russia–Ukraine–US trilateral talks took place in Abu Dhabi, following a preparatory visit to Moscow by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner. What does the choice of the Russian delegation tell us? What are Putin’s intentions? What does the Kremlin expect to see further, demonstrating pragmatism coupled with still-actual maximalist demands?

On the domestic front, January brought unusual delays in wage payments to social workers in several regions—a reflection of growing economic imbalances and mounting budgetary pressure at the regional level.

At the same time, the Kremlin has accelerated preparations for the State Duma elections, as indicated by a leaked draft list of United Russia’s leading candidates. The list, headed by Dmitry Medvedev and Sergey Lavrov, points not only to early electoral planning but also to ongoing internal wrangling over the party’s configuration and prospective personnel changes.

Finally, an emergency in the Belgorod region—where hundreds of thousands of residents were left without heating or electricity following Ukrainian retaliatory strikes—has exposed serious weaknesses in crisis response and the federal centre’s reluctance to publicly acknowledge the severity of the disruption.

For those monitoring how the Russian state is adjusting—strategically and structurally—this bulletin offers grounded, non-public insight essential for understanding what comes next.

https://rpolitik.com/bulletin/2-2026/abu-dhabi-talks-begin-putin-weighs-trump-s-council-fiscal-strains-surface-duma-list-leaks-belgorod-exposed?utm_source=telegram&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=smm_promo_rp&utm_content=bulletin_page

🚨 Why is Moscow perplexed by Trump's swift Venezuela "special operation"—and how is it reshaping Putin's Ukraine calculations?
As headlines buzz with Maduro's capture, US oil control, Greenland threats, and stalled Ukraine talks, my new R.Politik Bulletin No. 1 (175) reveals Russia's contradictory responses and strategic shifts you won't find in mainstream coverage.

With 2026 off to a turbulent start—US seizures of Russian-linked tankers, NATO tensions over Greenland, and fears of Venezuelan oil flooding markets—this edition unpacks the pressures converging on Russian policymaking.

Key insights you'll find inside:

📌Ukraine Peace Talks on the Brink: US, Ukraine, and Europe near a full framework with NATO-style security guarantees—leaving Moscow in a precarious spot: disrupt without alienating Trump. After an alleged drone hit on Putin's residence and a fresh Oreshnik strike on Lviv, Russia's hardening its stance: Will Putin retract earlier "Anchorage deal" concessions?

📌Venezuela Shockwaves in Moscow: Trump's Maduro capture sparks apprehension, awe, and discord. Ultra-patriots express indignation at the "embarrassing" contrast to Ukraine's prolonged war; some in leadership debate if it's a threat or opens a "new wonder world." Exclusive: Moscow's confused reaction and how it views this as a blow to the international order.

📌Greenland Factor Looms: As Trump doubles down on acquiring the territory "at any cost," testing NATO unity—Putin sees tactical opportunities in disrupting alliances short-term, prioritizing less confrontation with the US and more hostility toward Europe.

📌Domestic Developments: Putin's year-end meeting with big business signals pessimism amid inflation and stagnation. Plus, speculation swirls on Dmitry Kozak: Prime minister contender or sidelined figure?

📌Rising Xenophobia Wave: Anti-migrant backlash surges with Indian laborers' influx, exposing rifts between security hawks and economy chiefs facing labor shortages.

2026 Outlook: What Russians really expect this year, plus hard data on 2025's industrial slowdown locking in "economy mode."

This bulletin cuts through the noise with exclusive analysis on Russia's opportunistic pivot—less confrontational toward the US, more hostile to Europe—amid a world order in flux. If you're tracking Venezuela Crisis, Ukraine War, or Trump's assertive moves, this is your insider edge.
Subscribe to R.Politik for the full issue, archives, and future deep dives—stay ahead in 2026's geopolitical storm.


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