Pravda_Gerashchenko_en

These rigged Russian "elections" were designed so that the war would receive political support regardless of the outcome. There was effectively no anti-war choice on the federal ballot. All the parties that were allowed to participate supported Putin’s war course in one way or another. The only party with a clearly anti-war position, Yabloko, was excluded from the federal elections.

These elections were staged in such a way that it had already been predetermined who could participate, which positions could be represented, and who would have access to television. In other words, most of the control over the "elections" took place before a person even arrived to vote.

But there is another important point. Not everything can be explained solely by pressure from the Kremlin. The Communist Party, LDPR, A Just Russia, New People, and other parties could have taken an anti-war position. Yabloko shows that such a choice was possible, although extremely risky. The other parties did not make that choice. Some openly and firmly support the war. Others speak about it more cautiously or try not to make it the focus of their campaigns. But no major party told voters: we are against continuing the war, and we want a different course.

And that is already an important indicator not only of the regime, but also of the political environment itself. Parties are made up of politicians, candidates, activists, and regional structures. They look at which positions can win them support and which could destroy them politically. The fact that almost the entire legal party system agreed to exist within a pro-war consensus means that over these years, the war has become normalized within Russia’s social and political life.

Another important element is turnout control. The Kremlin needed not only a victory for United Russia, but also high participation that could be presented as evidence of mass support. Official turnout was 59.3%, but it varied greatly across regions. The difference in itself proves nothing, but it shows that the overall figure conceals very different patterns of mobilization.

The mechanism becomes clearer when looking at when and how people voted. 62% of electronic votes were cast as early as Friday, while 58% of public-sector employees reported being mobilized to vote early. Among those who voted on Friday, United Russia received around 55%, while among Sunday voters it received around 25%. In other words, the authorities do not necessarily have to directly order people whom to vote for: it is enough to organize the early turnout of voters dependent on the state through controlled channels. This simultaneously increases turnout and strengthens the ruling party’s result.

It is also telling that this time Putin personally became much more actively involved in United Russia’s campaign. Previously, he more often tried to remain above the party: supporting it without tying himself too closely to a specific result. In 2026, he actively met with candidates, spoke at party events, traveled to the regions, and urged people to vote. Yet this did not help: United Russia received extremely low actual results.

Despite the predictability of the outcome, these elections still deserve attention.

First, the Kremlin now fully controls the election preparation process. High turnout has become a political objective for Putin, while the rigged result for United Russia is being presented by the Kremlin as a mandate to continue the current course and the war.

At the same time, the difference between Friday and Sunday voting, low turnout in some regions, and Yabloko’s result in Novgorod show that even total control has not yet eliminated the demand for a genuine political choice among parts of Russian society.

Dmitry Rogozin, a senator of the Russian Federation representing the occupied part of the Zaporizhzhia region, explains to MGIMO (top Russian university) students how Russian propaganda works.

Russia spends enormous amounts of money on its propaganda machine, both inside Russia and around the world.

I once wrote that Russian propaganda is more dangerous than an atomic bomb. And I still believe that is the case.

The term “cognitive warfare” is widely used today. You can call it whatever you want, but Russian narratives and propaganda are deadly dangerous.

They change reality by changing people’s positions and, consequently, their behavior. Russians are very skilled at delivering their narratives to the audiences they need to reach. They have the necessary technologies and an unlimited budget. They work with social media algorithms. They have controlled media outlets and the bought support of influencers. They target not only the masses, but also individuals who make key decisions.

It is very important now, when everyone is exhausted and tired, not to underestimate the efforts to counter and fight Russia’s information machine.

Every voice aimed at protecting people’s minds, critical thinking, and the information space from hostile manipulation, disinformation, and psychological pressure is important and critical.

I'm grateful to everyone: politicians, journalists, bloggers, volunteers - everyone who continues to expose Russian manipulation, counter disinformation, critically verify information, and keeps the world informed with verified news every day.

Friends, let’s stand together and do our job.

So-called "elections" have now taken place in Russia, which saw the largest-scale electoral fraud in the history of the Russian Federation.

Now it’s time for mobilization. It will be carried out in exactly the same way - without resistance and without any problems for the Kremlin.

In the video, a Russian woman explains how people are already going door to door with prepared lists.

President Trump:

The United States is working on a massive deal to purchase potash from Belarus.

"So now we’re waiting for mobilization as soon as possible, and for prices to go up.
Gasoline is already f*cked - they’re starting to hand out 30 liters at a time. Basically, everything is going to f*cking fly now, fly like the f*cking "Geran" drone. At the speed of light, straight f*cking down."

Russian Z-blogger Golman’s predictions continue to be a real source of optimism.

President Trump:

Russia has unfortunately lost control of its Diesel Oil Industry due to its War with Ukraine.

President Trump says the war must be ended.

I agree wholeheartedly. The United States have the leverages needed to make Russia stop this horrible war it started.

The commander of the 2nd Mechanized Battalion, 125th Brigade, shares the behind-the-scenes on Operation Vivaldi.

Peskov:

"Russia poses no threat to France or to any state in Europe. President Putin has repeatedly stated this. We have no disputes with any European states that could cause any serious disagreements.

Therefore, Russia presents no threat, Russia is not threatening anyone and is not blackmailing anyone."

Comment from me: I wonder if anyone still believes this bullsh*t after Peskov himself said Russia would not attack Ukraine just days before the full-scale invasion.

Unsurprisingly, United Russia party gets the most mandates into the Russian Duma. It now has the constitutional majority, enough to make any amendments and changes to the Russian constitution, for example. Putin has solidified his power even further.

There will also be 86 "SMO participants" in the Duma - so people who went to Putin's illegal war of aggression, invaded a sovereign country, will now be responsible for Russian legislation.

Not a single day without Russian attacks on Ukraine - civilians killed and injured, homes and infrastructure destroyed.

▪️ Russians struck the railway station in Lozova, Kharkiv region. A woman was killed, and three more people were injured. Residential buildings and administrative buildings were damaged.

▪️ Two people were killed and three more were injured, including a child, in Sumy region. Russians attacked with drones and aviation. An educational institution, apartment buildings, and private houses were damaged.

▪️ In Zaporizhzhia, at least 10 people were injured. Russians struck the historic building of Zaporizhzhia National University. Residential buildings and a shopping center were damaged.

▪️ In Kirovohrad region, an enterprise worker was injured. Russians struck one of the facilities in Kropyvnytskyi district. Private houses were damaged.

▪️ In Kyiv region, one person was injured. A vehicle service station and a sawmill building caught fire.

▪️ In Chernihiv region, Russians attacked an enterprise. A hangar caught fire, agricultural machinery was damaged, and livestock was injured.

▪️ Russia struck warehouse premises in Odesa region, causing a large-scale fire.

Drones reportedly attacked an oil refinery in Ufa, Bashkortostan, Russia.

The city is located ~1,600 km from the Ukrainian border and is one of Russia’s largest oil refining centers, with a combined processing capacity of more than 23 million tonnes of oil per year.

Why do Russians dislike the Lindsey Graham Act? Because it is not just another sanctions package. Above all, it represents a major restructuring of the sanctions architecture toward Russia.

The law simultaneously codifies some of the sanctions already in place against Russia, creates new mandatory mechanisms for the U.S. administration, and expands the range of Russian and foreign companies, banks, vessels, and individuals that may be subject to blocking sanctions. Part of the sanctions policy is being moved from presidential executive orders into federal law. This means that a future president will have a harder time quickly dismantling a significant portion of the sanctions regime through a single executive order.

The second major change is that the administration will now be required to regularly determine exactly who falls under the sanctions criteria. For a number of provisions, the first review must take place within 30 days of the law being signed - that is, by October 18 - and then every 180 days thereafter. In many cases, once an individual or company is determined to meet the relevant criteria, the law requires sanctions to be imposed.

One of the broadest sections concerns Russian state-owned enterprises. The law covers entities in which the Russian government holds a controlling or majority stake, as well as those that are “otherwise affiliated with the Government of the Russian Federation.” Such companies are subject to full blocking sanctions. Potentially, this provision could apply to Gazprom, Transneft, Russian Railways, Rostelecom, Rosatom, and other major state-owned entities. However, the practical scope of the sanctions will depend on how broadly the Treasury Department interprets the term “affiliated.” That is why the focus should be not only on formal waivers, but primarily on the methodology and the first lists.

Another major section targets the financial system and international networks used to circumvent sanctions. The law codifies sanctions on Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, and other Russian financial institutions with state participation, while allowing action against foreign banks that conduct significant transactions with them. It also allows sanctions to be imposed on financial messaging services and specific payment infrastructure knowingly used to evade sanctions.

At the same time, the law covers foreign suppliers to Russia’s defense industry - companies supplying CNC machines, nitrocellulose, military-grade fiber optics, advanced sensors, and other critical components. This creates direct risks for companies in China, Turkey, the UAE, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and other jurisdictions if they meet the criteria established by the law.

The “shadow fleet” is addressed separately. Sanctions may target not only tankers transporting Russian energy products in circumvention of sanctions or the price cap, but also their owners, operators, managers, insurers, related parties, and foreign ports that service already-sanctioned vessels. The entire infrastructure supporting Russia’s maritime exports therefore comes under pressure. At the same time, sanctions imposed by the EU, the UK, G7, or Five Eyes may be used by the U.S. administration as prima facie evidence.

The energy section of the law prohibits new U.S. investments in Russia’s energy sector and allows sanctions against foreign persons providing goods, technology, services, or other support for the production of oil, gas, LNG, uranium, petroleum products, and coal for already-sanctioned Russian entities.

Yamal LNG, Arctic LNG 1, 2, and 3, as well as future Arctic LNG projects, are specifically named. Sanctions could apply to their executives, board members, and controlling or majority shareholders. This is particularly important for Europe, since Russian LNG from Yamal still reaches France, Belgium, and Spain ahead of the EU’s full ban taking effect.

Rosatom is also addressed separately, although the specific provision concerning its leadership and controlling shareholders is tied to the U.S. exemption regime for imports of Russian low-enriched uranium. Individual Rosatom entities could nevertheless be covered earlier under other provisions, including the state-owned enterprise provision.

Tariffs remain the most visible part of the law, but their practical impact has yet to be determined. For goods imported directly from Russia, the law provides for an additional tariff of up to 500%.

For third countries, tariffs of up to 100% could be imposed on all of their exports to the United States if they are among the five largest purchasers of Russian oil or gas and continue making new purchases after the law takes effect, or if they are among the five countries providing the greatest assistance in circumventing oil sanctions.

The law does not establish a minimum tariff rate. For gas purchasers, there is an exception: the tariff may not apply if a country purchases less than 15% of Russia’s total gas exports and takes “significant steps” to reduce those purchases. The term “significant steps” itself is not defined.

Among the obvious potential targets of the tariff mechanism are China, India, and Turkey as major purchasers of Russian oil. China is also a major purchaser of Russian gas. For Japan and European countries, the outcome will depend on how the administration applies the gas exception.

Another unresolved question is whether Washington will count the EU as a single entity or treat each member state separately. If they are counted separately, Hungary and Slovakia would be among the countries most exposed on oil, while Hungary would be exposed on gas. If the EU is counted as a bloc, it could itself fall within the group of major purchasers of Russian energy.

An even more open question concerns the five countries providing the greatest assistance in circumventing oil sanctions. The law allows the administration to consider financing of purchases, transportation, shadow-fleet operations, and other services, but it does not establish a clear formula for determining the top five. The UAE is an obvious candidate, but the rest of the list will depend on the administration’s methodology.

The law simultaneously strengthens Ukraine’s and Congress’s positions while creating new tools for the U.S. administration.

For Ukraine, it provides additional mechanisms for pressuring Russian state revenues, the financial system, the defense industry, the energy sector, and international sanctions-evasion networks.

In addition, the termination of key sanctions is tied to a peace agreement adopted by a free and independent government of Ukraine, the cessation of hostilities, and Russia’s renunciation of activities aimed at undermining the Ukrainian government.

Congress gains greater control through the codification of sanctions, regular reviews, reporting requirements, and a 30-day review period before the termination of the sanctions regime.

The administration, meanwhile, receives stronger tools for influencing third countries - including secondary sanctions against banks and companies and the ability to impose tariffs on a country’s entire exports to the United States.

The key date now is October 18.

The first things to watch are the initial designations and the methodology: which Russian state-owned companies the administration determines are covered by Section 104; how far it goes against the shadow fleet; whether it imposes sanctions on foreign defense-industry suppliers and banks; what it does with Yamal LNG and other Arctic projects; which countries it places on the lists of Russian energy purchasers and sanctions-evasion facilitators; what tariff rates it sets; and which exemptions it uses.

These decisions will show how broadly the Trump administration intends to use the powers granted to it by the law.

FM Sikorski:

The fact that Ukraine has destroyed, by estimates, between 30% and 40% of Russia’s refining capacity has already led to logistical difficulties for both Russia’s civilian economy and its military operations.

So, given that Ukraine managed to achieve this despite having virtually no air force - lacking, for instance, the operational capability to fly over Russian territory, I have told the Russians (partly as a deterrent): "Watch out, because we have more combat aircraft than you do."

▪️Russian reality:

Russian defense ministry: The Kyiv regime's attempt at a massive attack on Moscow failed, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces failed to achieve their goals, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported.

▪️Real reality: see image.

Amazing:

During Operation Vivaldi, Ukrainian forces deployed ground robots behind Russian lines. The 3rd Army Corps reported that this maneuver was carried out for the first time in the world.

Heavy bomber drones delivered the kamikaze robots, while air defense and electronic warfare systems suppressed Russian drones.

"Wars are won by infantry, but we protect our infantrymen, so robots go to the enemy first" - 3rd Army Corps.

Remotely controlled interceptor drones and robotic weapon systems are slowly becoming a reality:

"There will still be a person involved, but the number of people required will be significantly smaller," says Major Maksym Zaichenko, commander of the Aquila Air Defense Regiment, speaking about the unit’s shift toward remotely operated air defense.

The idea is to use remotely operated interceptor drones and robotic weapon systems to protect Ukrainian airspace while reducing the number of personnel exposed to the front line.

Interceptor drone operators can already engage Russian drones while operating far from the battlefield - potentially even from another country. The unit is also developing remote weapon stations mounted on robotic platforms, which could further reduce the number of troops needed near the line of contact.

📹: NV

Russia has imposed nighttime movement restrictions near the Narva Estonian border from September 16 to 26.

According to the Federal Security Service, people and vehicles are prohibited from being outside populated areas during nighttime hours within a 5-km-wide strip along the state border in the Kingisepp and Slantsy districts.