🎙 Statement by Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation, Deputy Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Konstantin Vorontsov at the Thematic Debate on Cluster I “Nuclear Weapons” in the First Committee of the 81st Session of the United Nations General Assembly

📍 New York, October 16, 2026

💬 Russia is committed to the ideals of nuclear disarmament according to a comprehensive approach envisaged by the provisions of the NPT. The Treaty unconditionally remains for us the key legal benchmark and the foundation for the efforts in this field. <...>

We consider ideas of a “shortcut” to “nuclear zero” – providing for the immediate and unconditional renunciation of nuclear weapons through arbitrarily outlawing them – to be unrealistic and counterproductive.

We are firmly convinced that disarmament initiatives must be appropriate for the military-political and strategic context.

The nuclear disarmament process, in particular, cannot be separated from the state of affairs in relations between nuclear-weapon States. <...>

❌ Factors which have an extremely negative impact on the military-political and strategic situation, and thereby hinder the implementation of disarmament initiatives, include, amongst others:

• NATO’s self-proclaimed “nuclear status” and the development by the bloc of schemes and means of “nuclear sharing” based on the forward deployment of the US nuclear weapons;

• the inclusion of elements of the NATO nuclear sharing into the United States “extended deterrence” arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region, with a tendency towards establishing a tripartite “nuclear alliance” between the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan;

• the shift by the European nuclear-weapon States towards building up their arsenals, joint planning for their use, and engaging non-nuclear NATO allies in a multifaceted support for such operations within the framework of “forward deterrence” and other algorithms complementing the US nuclear “umbrella”;

• the establishment of a global and multi-domain US missile defence system coupled with the build-up of offensive systems designed for a disarming first strike;

• the forward deployment of the United States-made and other Western-made ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles;

• US steps to deploy weapons in outer space;

• the NATO countries’ pursuit of consolidation of their cumulative advantage in non-nuclear military capabilities in all operational environments;

• bringing the NATO strategic military infrastructure close to the borders of Russia and its allies, accompanied by a destabilising build-up of significant combat forces in those areas.

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The NPT remains one of the cornerstones of international peace and security.

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It is important to exclude the use of the NPT and non-proliferation rhetoric for pursuing narrow, selfish political objectives unrelated to the Treaty’s objectives, let alone for justifying military aggression against undesired countries.

The mechanism for verifying States’ compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, and the IAEA safeguards system as its core element, should not be undermined. <...>

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (#CTBT).

The Russian Federation was the first of the five nuclear-weapon States to join the CTBT and did so on the day it was opened for signature, September 24, 1996. Russia remains a State Signatory to the CTBT, with all the rights and obligations arising from that status.

❗️ However, if the United States or other States Parties to the Treaty conduct full-scale nuclear tests, Russia, too, will have to appropriately and adequately respond. We continue to follow this approach consistently.

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