HeyHeyHayden

Full 2026 table for those who are interested.

September 2026 military vehicle loss statistics are in.

Russian losses are from UkraineWarSpotting, Ukrainian losses are from LostArmour.

I only include destroyed and captured, so no damaged ones, unclear footage or lack of aftermath. I've updated the August figures as well, with only a few additions to both sides.

🫡 Дальний удар 50-й отдельной Бригады «ВАРЯГ» по истребителю противника «МИГ-29»

09.09 в районе н.п. Васильков поступила информация о заходе на посадку вражеского истребителя. В ходе разведки, на аэродроме была обнаружена тепловая сигнатура с характерным тепловым следом. Было принято решение нанести удар. На кадрах досмотра зафиксировано уничтожение вражеского истребителя «МИГ-29»

🌐 Наш сайт для отбора кандидатов в
Москве | Московской обл

😉 Наш TG-бот для отбора кандидатов

📲 Связь с подразделением:
• Телефон №1: +79856758821
• Телефон №2: +79153251169

ПОДПИШИСЬ: 💬 TG-канал «ВАРЯГ» | 📲 MAX «ВАРЯГ»

Another Ukrainian MIG-29 destroyed by remote controlled Gerans, this time at Vasylkiv Airbase, southwest of Kyiv: 50°13'47.67"N 30°17'45.44"E

Whilst not common (last one was in late June, Voznesensk Airfield, Mykolaiv) these Geran hits are becoming more frequent now that they are near-constantly flying over cities deeper in Ukraine and loitering (doing recon).

Ukraine will need to balance how close they keep their jets to Russia to shorten response times to missile/drone attacks and the risk of them being found and destroyed by the ever increasing number of remote controlled Gerans.

Region circled on Suriyak's map to make it clear, but you can do the same with the mapper of your choice.

One thing I will mention is the growing number of strikes taking place in and around the fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast.

Following Russia effectively taking control of Kostyantynivka (bar some fighting in the outermost streets) and pushing the frontline up and over the Siverksyi-Donets canal their drone operators have been able to move forward and are now in a position to launch constant strikes on the cities. Drones are constantly surveying them and the surrounding areas, leading to many vehicles being detected in their hiding places or as they try travel along the roads.

As has happened with all town/city battles over the past two years, over time Ukraine will be forced to decrease and eventually stop their vehicle usage as it will simply be too dangerous to try operate artillery or tanks within the cities, whilst other vehicles will be struck as they attempt to get into or out of these localities. They can try to maintain stable supply and reinforcement but as happened with Kostyantynivka and Pokrovsk/Myrnorhad they will incur a constant number of vehicle losses each day just to achieve this, which will escalate over time as the frontline moves closer and alternative routes are cut. These vehicle losses add up and every day spent trying to hold the localities will result in a higher cost, eventually leading to Ukraine being forced to switch to an on-foot or drone only supply. This will buy them more time but is not a solution, as drones are simply not capable/flexible enough to make up for proper vehicle supply chains, whilst soldiers on foot is too manpower intensive and costly to maintain.

Now all this is a long way off, certainly not until 2027 for Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, but we are in the beginning stages of this cycle. Keep an eye out for an increase in vehicle losses (both military and civilian/generic) in and around the fortress cities as the frontline closes in and the supply pressure starts to mount.

No major changes in the current trends for August, so I won't go too in depth with every category to save myself from repeating things I've stated several times already.

No Russian mechanised wave this month so tank losses are lower and a few more Ukrainian tanks lost than usual (I'll go into this in another comment). IFV and APC usage remains at about the same level as it has for the past few months; highly limited Russian usage (mostly well behind the frontline) and greater Ukrainian usage on and behind the frontline. Ukraine continues to lose an enormous number of MRAPs/Armoured cars whilst Russia really only uses them in the rear so losses are always going to be disproportionate.

SPG losses remains a major concern for Ukraine although Russia lost some more systems than usual (no particular area or region, so hard to tell if there is a pattern or just luck). Of Ukraine's SPG losses about 51% were old Soviet stockpile (2S1, 2S3), 25% western donated systems (AS-90, M109, Krab, PZH2000, etc) and 25% domestically put together (2S22, made from western provided parts and chassis) this month. So despite the usual reports of high domestic artillery production Ukraine is still incredibly reliant on old stockpiles and donated systems, which will eventually run out as they have not received more in a long time.

MLRS and engineering losses remain standard, significantly higher Russian usage leads to higher losses of MLRS, whilst engineering vehicles see incredibly little usage as there aren't mechanised attacks needing minefields/ditches/dragons teeth to be breached.

Here is the full 2026 table for those who want totals and a comparison

August 2026 military vehicle loss statistics are in.

As always, Russian losses are from UkraineWarSpotting and Ukrainian losses are from LostArmour.

I am only including destroyed and captured vehicles, so no damaged ones, unclear footage or lack of aftermath. I've updated the July figures as well, with no changes to Russian losses and a few added to Ukrainian losses (nothing notable).

August vehicle loss statistics will go up around 5 September. As always I am allowing time for the databases to add in losses from the final days of the month and will go back and update July's figures in case there are any late additions (typically only a couple of vehicles in one or two categories).

Just the July column

Telegram loves to butcher the quality when I post them as photos but here is the table in slightly higher quality.

No major surprises for July, just more of the same trends that have been observed throughout the year:

1. Russian tank losses were a bit higher this month entirely due to that one odd mechanised wave towards Shakhove.

2. IFV usage has continued to decline and is at near record low levels for both sides, hence the incredibly low losses. Yes Ukraine has lost a significant amount over the war and hasn't been getting replacements for years now, but they definitely still have many hundreds left and Russia will have thousands (plus new production). Neither side has run out, it is very much a case of low usage across the entire frontline (same as most military vehicles).

3. APC losses remain consistently higher for Ukraine than for Russia. Their usage has also dropped since 2025, hence them being far low than that year's monthly losses, but Russia has been able to decrease their usage by far more and has been better at hunting Ukrainian APCs.

4. MRAPs/Armoured Cars is the same as always; Russia only uses them in the rear and doesn't field nearly as many, so their losses are miniscule, compared to Ukraine who uses them extensively across all fronts and areas as their workhorse equipment type. The June update saw quite a few added as late entries for the last day in that month and I expect the same this time, so the final figure of Ukrainian MRAP/Armoured Car losses will be higher than shown here.

5. Similarly SPG losses have been similar to previous months; Russia fields far more of them but has been able to protect them significantly better than Ukraine and their drone teams are far better at hunting down opposing SPGs. For ratios about 44% of Ukraine's SPG losses have been Soviet stockpile, 28% domestically put together (2S22s) and 28% foreign donated systems. So despite the claims of enormous 2S22 production the Soviet systems are still the workhouses of Ukraine's artillery forces and foreign systems, despite none having been donated in years, still make up a similar portion to Ukrainian produced ones.

6. MLRS, not much to say here. Russia fields significantly more than Ukraine and tends to lose more than them, although not for July. Majority of systems lost for both sides in July were basic MLRS like the BM-21 Grads, not the more expensive long range systems.

7. As always engineering losses are incredibly low due to a complete lack of usage as there isn't a need for them to be deployed to clear minefields for assaults or breach fortification lines. 1 of the Russian losses also looks older judging by the rusting on the photo and the other was a mid range strike.

Personally I saw about 15 videos of Ukrainian SPGs being hit that weren't added to Lostarmour in July as there wasn't clear aftermath (explosion but no closeup or drone watching was too far away to see vehicle), so the actual number hit is likely quite a bit higher than shown here.

July 2026 Military vehicle loss statistics are in.

As always, Russian losses are from UkraineWarSpotting and Ukrainian losses are from LostArmour.

I am only including destroyed and captured vehicles, so no damaged ones, unclear footage or lack of aftermath. I also regularly go back and check previous month tallies as late vehicles or delayed footage is occasionally added, so June has had a few categories with minor changes.

APC losses didn't load in the previous post so they are here

Combined graphs and charts for 2025 and 2026 military vehicle losses for comparison.