Lebanon’s Resistance and the Path to a Unified National Defence Strategy

The question of resistance in Lebanon cannot be reduced to weapons or a simplistic choice between the state and the resistance.

This debate often obscures the more fundamental issue:

Has Lebanon achieved effective sovereignty over all its territory, and does the state possess the independent capabilities necessary to protect its people, defend its borders, deter external aggression, and make decisions on war and peace free from foreign dictates?

Armed resistance emerged under historical conditions shaped by occupation and the state’s limited defensive capacity.

Over time, it accumulated military experience and developed political and social influence, while the state remained unable to establish a fully independent national defence system capable of addressing the country’s security vulnerabilities.

Lebanon consequently faces a dual defence reality that cannot be resolved through an administrative decision to disarm the resistance, nor can it remain indefinitely outside a comprehensive national institutional framework.

Lebanese sovereignty cannot be measured solely by the state’s formal monopoly on weapons; it must also be assessed through the state’s actual ability to defend its territory and population.

Continued occupation, military threats, and external attacks fundamentally shape the debate over resistance because they raise an essential question: what credible protection can replace existing defensive capabilities?

The central problem, therefore, is not simply the existence of resistance, but the absence of an agreed national defence strategy.

The Lebanese Armed Forces must be central to any lasting solution; however, strengthening the army must involve genuine improvements in its capabilities, resources, training, and capacity to defend the country—not merely symbolic reforms or political declarations.

Moreover, national defence decisions must ultimately be Lebanese, institutional, and accountable.

A sustainable strategy cannot be built on the unconditional elimination of one side’s capabilities before an effective alternative exists.

Such an approach risks creating a security vacuum rather than strengthening the state.

A credible transition requires a carefully sequenced process: ending occupation and external aggression; securing sovereignty and borders; enabling enforcely–displaced residents to return; strengthening the army and state institutions; establishing legitimate national defence decision-making mechanisms; and addressing how the accumulated capabilities and experience of the resistance can contribute to a unified national defence framework.

This approach offers a possible historical compromise between permanent military duality and premature disarmament; its objective is to transform the defensive function that resistance developed under exceptional circumstances into a sustainable national responsibility exercised through legitimate state institutions.

The transition Lebanon needs is not from resistance to a security vacuum, but from separate defensive capabilities to unified national defence, from fragmented decision-making to sovereign Lebanese authority, and from historical necessity to a capable state.

Ultimately, Lebanon cannot achieve full sovereignty while exposed to occupation and external aggression, nor build a strong state by dismantling defensive capacity before establishing a credible alternative.

A unified national defence strategy offers a path toward protecting the population, preserving independence, and consolidating genuine sovereignty.