💬Evaluation
On Rights on Paper, Reality on the Ground
Al-Sharaa's Presidential Decree 13 recognised Kurdish as a national language and permits Kurdish-language education. On the surface, that's a big deal. In practice, though, the gap between the decree and what's actually happening is where the real tension lives. The August 30 protests at Rojava University and the 4,265 teachers in Afrin and eastern Aleppo facing an uncertain future make it clear that even a year on, Kurdish-language education is quietly being eroded. Crucially, none of these rights are anchored in a constitution, and Kurdish representatives weren't at the table when the constitutional drafting process kicked off in March 2025. That's not a great foundation for reconciliation.
The Kurdish project isn't over, but it's narrowing or shifting from a model of territorial administration toward a much more constrained negotiation over cultural rights, local governance, and administrative competences. If that process keeps stalling without real progress for Kurds, it risks setting a precedent that other minority communities in Syria will end up facing.
On the Economic Squeeze
Integration has also meant a noticeably worse economic situation in the northeast. The region was never rich, but it had a degree of self-reliance — oil revenue, local trade, its own management. Since the handover to Damascus, fuel subsidies have been cut, drinking water is a growing problem in several areas, and prices have been climbing. DAANES kept things as stable as it could with the resources it had; now that the central government is in charge, basic services and access to critical resources have become a much bigger issue than they were before.
On the SDF's Dissolution
Internally and abroad, the SDF's dissolution was framed as a "historic" moment. From the DAANES side, the picture is a lot more complicated. The SDF had been the largest organized military force outside Damascus's control for over a decade, and its dismantling wasn't really a negotiation so much as an imposition. The strong influence of Turkey, not just the government of al-Sharaa but also on the diplomatic US mission in middle east, has been critical. Erdogan attempts to get a green light for a big operation in northern Syria against SDF was not a secret. To avoid that and prevent such a doomsday scenario for the Kurdish population in Syria, SDF sat on the negotiation table to salvage certain degree of autonomy from SDF forces. The final agreement resulted in the integration of SDF in divisions local divisions (3 in hassakah, 1 in Kobane), keeping their command structures and their territorial integrity. Assayish (civil defense forces) got integrated in the ministry of interior in a similar deal, keeping also local autonomy. After months of negotiations about the role of YPJ in the new Syria, it finally got integrated in the ministry of interior, not in the military forces as intended.
The final agreements translate into big concessions with not many gains. Some basic recognition of cultural and political identity of the Kurdish people has been acknowledged by the new Syrian government, with Newroz recognized as a national holiday and Kurdish language as a subject in schools. On the ground, we can see many Kurds discontent with the results, deepening resentment and questioning the legitimacy of the new government. The self-administration and SDF showed their commitment to protect Kurdish lives, accepting to disolve in order to avoid war. Now all the efforts on building autonomy are gonna be put to real test. The grassroots organizing, with hundreds of local communes, academies and cooperatives, were to become the main vehicles of transformation of a democratic society.
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